



**Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive**  
**DSpace Repository**

---

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

---

1948

# Training the petty officers of the United States navy in human relations.

Yost, Allan D.

Northwestern University

---

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6599>

---

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

*Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun*



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

**Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School**  
**411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle**  
**Monterey, California USA 93943**

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

T H E S I S

"Training The Petty Officers of the U.S.  
Navy in Human Relations"

Prepared by Comdr. A. D. Yost, USN

Northwestern University, August, 1948

Thesis  
Y6

Thesis  
Y6

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Training the Petty Officers  
of the  
United States Navy  
in  
Human Relations

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
For the degree  
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Library  
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School  
Annapolis, Md.

By

Allen D. Yost

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

August, 1948

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction .....	1
Why Make an Investigation in the Area of Human Relations .....	10
A Preliminary Study .....	18
The Experimental Procedures .....	26
The Sample .....	26
How the Sample Was Used .....	26
The Questionnaires .....	31
The Interviews .....	32
Presentation of the Results .....	34
The Questionnaires .....	35
The Interviews .....	48
Summary of Results .....	52
The Proposed Plan .....	54
Summary and Conclusions .....	74
Appendix A (Analysis of the Preliminary Study) .....	77
Appendix B (Analysis of the Experimental Study) .....	86
Appendix C (The Conference and Conference Leader) .....	116
Bibliography .....	124



# LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
I.	Number of Petty Officers, by Rates, Participating in the Study .....	28
II.	Length of Service of Petty Officers Participating in the Study .....	29
III.	Length of Service as Petty Officers of the Petty Officers Participating in the Study .....	29
IV.	Age of the Petty Officers Participating in the Study .....	29
V.	Rates of the Non-Petty Officer (Non-Rated) Men Participating in the Study .....	30
VI.	Length of Naval Service of the Non-Rated Men Participating in the Study .....	30
VII.	Age of the Non-Rated Men Participating in the Study .....	30
VIII.	Publications Listed by Petty Officers as Containing Basic Rules of the Navy .....	44

### Acknowledgments

The writer wishes to acknowledge the guidance of Dr. A. C. Van Dusen under whose direction this thesis was prepared, as well as the suggestions given by Dr. S. A. Hamrin. Acknowledgment is also made to my wife for her assistance and patience.

Training the Petty Officers  
of the  
United States Navy  
in  
Human Relations

Introduction

All too frequently remarks are made by persons who were members of our armed forces during the recent war that they liked the armed services pretty well, but--and then the irritating aspects will begin to be listed. In fact, it is not uncommon for individuals now in the service to make such remarks. These remarks are most frequently made by the non-commissioned personnel, and it would seem that they indicate a problem that needs careful and prompt attention. Further indications of the presence of this problem in the Navy have been the fact that: (1) At most stations and ships orders and directions are sometimes violated in an almost intentional manner by both petty officers and non-rated personnel; (2) Morale is sometimes low; (3) Too large a number of the personnel are on report for offenses committed; (4) Orders and directions do not seem to "get through to all hands"; and (5) Frequently the personnel seem confused about the rules and regulations and what is expected of them. Henceforth, this discussion will consider problems only as they pertain to the Navy.

In addition to these evidences which are frequently thought of as "local" conditions, poor training, or almost any number of



excuses to pass them off, we find many references to this problem in the articles printed in the current publications. The problem has been referred to in many ways, such as:

It is further recommended that war-time training be a condensation of the training in peacetime with change in emphasis from theoretical to practical training in (1) human relations, (2) the actual handling of men individually and collectively, formally and informally, in and out of military formations.<sup>1</sup>

Other references appeared in an article written by Captain Alan McCracken, U.S. Navy, entitled, "The Frivolous Man," which also points to the problem. Captain McCracken writes:

While I believe that an honest, conscientious officer or petty officer can be considerably aided by some knowledge of leadership psychology, I also believe that in our current enthusiasm we are apt to overdo the mechanics and make it far too complicated. Actually about all that is necessary is to realize that what you say to a man and how you treat him will produce in him exactly the same reactions they would produce in you. A sensitivity that enables you to see objectively just how you would react will take the place of all the books on psychology ever written--and it can't be learned out of a book. Couple this sensitivity with a sincere respect and consideration for other human beings, a never-failing tact and courtesy and dignity and justice, and you will not have many troubles with personnel ... Nevertheless, this is no reason for not trying to do our best to improve the leadership abilities of those who are placed in positions that require them to lead.<sup>2</sup>

All of these indications seem to point to the human relations that are found in the Naval service as having a considerable amount of influence on the problem. Therefore, it will be of value to investigate carefully what is meant by human relations and where it is developed. The present study will be limited to the inter-relationship of individ-

<sup>1</sup> Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May, 1947, "Analytical Study on Leadership Instruction, by a Student Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 1948, pp. 373-377.

uals in the United States Navy, and of the rates of petty officers first, second, and third class, and the non-rated personnel.

United States Naval ships and stations are organizations which in turn make up the one large organization known as the United States Navy. Each ship and station has its own "Organization Manual" which pictures the make-up of the particular unit. If we have an organization, we had best know precisely what an organization is and what should be expected from it. Organization has been defined as:

The process of so combining the work which individuals or groups have to perform with the facilities necessary for its execution that the duties, so formed, provide the best channels for the efficient, systematic, positive, and coordinated application of the available effort.<sup>1</sup>

That is precisely the way every Naval establishment is arranged. If we have organization--as we do--then it is necessary to have some management. This term has been defined by Sheldon as:

The function ... concerned in the execution of policy, within the limits set up by administration, and the employment of the organization for the particular objects set before it.<sup>2</sup>

Appley has given management a somewhat simpler definition: "Management is getting other folks to do things."<sup>3</sup> The relationship between the two has been clearly shown by Sheldon when he wrote: "Organization is the formation of an effective machine; management, of an effective executive."<sup>4</sup>

These terms are primarily used in industry; however, we have seen that they apply to the establishment of the Navy. Therefore, it

<sup>1</sup>The Philosophy of Management, Oliver Sheldon, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Lecture, Lawrence A. Appley, to class in "Advanced Organization and Management," Northwestern University, December, 1947.

<sup>4</sup>The Philosophy of Management, Oliver Sheldon, p. 32.



is logical to believe that problems peculiar to "management" in industry may be similar to problems of human relations in the Navy. We have seen that management is getting other folks to do things; therefore, we can say that the officers and petty officers are the managers of the Navy. It will be noted that the definition does not restrict the function to any one level, so we must assume that it is a continuous chain including the officers and the petty officers--in fact, any person charged with getting others to do things is a part of management.

The problem seems to have been traced to one of human relations; therefore, we had best define that term. Human relations has been defined as, "The art of getting others to want to act in some desired manner."<sup>1</sup> Note the similarity of this definition to that for management. If the problem is one of human relations, it would now seem closely connected with management, and management involves the officers and petty officers in particular. Many problems should be solved by properly training management (the officers and petty officers) in how to get others to want to act in some desired manner. In this investigation it will be desirable to determine whether or not the function of management has been performed with good practices pertaining to inter-relationships of all personnel.

Human relations enters all phases of life. It is found in sports, games, work, home life, in fact wherever people are found human relations will be found. However, it must be remembered that full advantage can be taken of this art, or any degree of it can be used even to the point of negative value. Conditions effecting human relations

<sup>1</sup>Training Supervisors in Human Relations, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York, p.3.

are referred to when statements are made that a worker is just "no good"; command does not issue orders in an understandable manner; orders and directions are not made known to petty officers; petty officers are not handling men correctly; petty officers are not properly trained, et cetera.

The following conditions are basic to a consideration of human relations:

1. Attitudes of the individual.
2. Sentiments of the individual.
3. Opinions of the individual.
4. Formal organization of the institution.
5. Informal organization in the institution.

These basic conditions frequently vary for the individual and the institution. Considering only the first three basic factors just mentioned, the causes of individual differences have been given as: (1) The biological basis--the anatomical structures for dynamic functioning of sense organs, nerves; (2) The amount of previous training that has been accomplished; and (3) The intermediate step called the peculiar work methods or patterns of behavior adopted to solve problems or in the finished performance.

Human behavior may be classified as: (1) Sensory, such as perception, imagination, and memory; (2) Affective processes, such as feelings, emotions, attitudes, temperaments, and appreciation; (3) Motor processes, such as muscular and glandular activity; and (4) Symbolic behavior--intellectual or thought processes, which are largely verbal, and sometimes considered a combination of the former three types.

All behavior has all four of these classes, and can be affected by changing any one of the four classes, or their emphasis. Overlapping of steps in a series of activities or parts of an operation



6

definitely affects development of the final act. For instance, learning to do new things uses actions and ideas previously learned.

Individual differences in people are large and usually fairly stable in ordinary environments. They may be due to heredity but environment definitely affects them. For instance, people from warm climates usually dislike cold weather; some can work mathematical problems easily; others cannot.

The personnel situation may be improved for any activity by: (1) Making wise initial selection of individuals; (2) Even if this has not been done, it may be worth while to train the individual; (3) Motivate the individual, provide an incentive for him; and (4) Improve the tools and facilities with which he works.

Each person is a distinctive individual in himself--that is, he has a social stimulus value which causes him to be socially liked or disliked or to be vocationally effective in various degrees.<sup>1</sup>

Individuals differ in all their qualities. Some have great strength of character; others are weak in this area. Some are able leaders, while others have no ability along this line; some have good judgment, while others seem to have none at all; some have much energy, while others are completely lacking in energy.

Since both industry and the Navy must consider these individual differences in people, it is believed that these basic facts add further proof to the statement that problems in human relations found in industry may also be found in the Navy.

The last two factors, the formal and informal organization, will be discussed later in this study.

<sup>1</sup>Lectures, Class in Individual Differences, Dr. H.H. Seashore, Northwestern University, Winter Term, 1948.

Important studies have been made which have provided information on the determination and use of human relations and its effect on the individual, as well as on the organization. The most outstanding of these is the research program conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago, and reported by L.J. Roethlisberger and W.J. Dickson in their book entitled, "Management and the Worker," which will be referred to frequently in this study.

Professor Ronald Lippitt of the Research Center for Group Dynamics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has made a research concerning the differences of social perception of parents, teachers and students in a school system. The results of this research have not been published as of this date; however, preliminary results have been announced and promise to give insight to the field of human relations.

There are various points of view that have been presented concerning this problem. It is not uncommon to hear that an individual is just not petty officer material--he has no qualifications, and therefore there is no problem and human relations does not enter. In some cases that may be true, but in how many cases have marginal men who have had to be used as petty officers (and as officers) been wasted strictly because the best that was in them was not used due to this point of view.

Another point of view is that some officers are not efficient and do not know how to get work out of their men. Sometimes this is also true, but again how often it has been a fact that the officer and the petty officers would have worked well together had they understood each other.



Often one will hear the opinion that a petty officer is just lacking in technical training and just does not know his job, and that is the reason he is not an efficient petty officer. Human relations is no substitute for technical knowledge, but it is a factor to be used in determining whether or not a man has the technical training. The use of good human relations procedures may help prevent the occurrence of such a circumstance as has just been described.

If this investigation should demonstrate that there is a lack of understanding of attitudes, opinions and sentiments between the levels of supervision and the non-rated personnel, and that there is a lack of common ground for thought in these areas, then it can be assumed that good human relations is not being practiced. We can then assume that this is because such relationships either are not understood or are not being taught to and by the levels of supervision, or that these two reasons are working in combination. Lack of application of methods making for successful human relations can be a large cause of trouble and inefficiency in human endeavor.

One method of investigating the problem can be explained as follows: Lack of agreement between the groups will indicate a lack of common ground on these basic elements. Inquiry can be made into what various groups consider as the policy, or rules and guides, of the service. Disagreement on such a fundamental question will clearly indicate a deficiency at the very foundation of human relations. Interviews will frequently indicate problems that are disturbing to a group and can be traced to their causes by the person making the survey. This may also indicate common ground, or lack of common ground, between groups.



Since human relations is based on attitudes, opinions and sentiments of people, and attitudes, opinions and sentiments can generally be determined by properly prepared scales and questionnaires, it is possible to obtain a comparison of the attitudes, opinions and sentiments of any number of groups of people. The above methods will be used in this investigation.

Interviews using "open-ending" questions might indicate basic attitudes, but this method would require more time and more highly trained interviewers than are available for this study.

One method considered was the comparison of two groups; one to receive intensive training in human relations, then sent to practice it; the other group just to supervise as best they can, then after a given time compare the morals, infractions of rules and ability of the two groups, to see if good human relations is practiced by both groups. This method would require too much time and would require personnel to be detailed for the experiment. The results would probably be no more conclusive than those obtained through the use of questionnaires.

Why Make an Investigation  
in the  
Area of Human Relations?

It has been shown that there is evidence of the existence of a personnel problem within the Navy, and some of the indications have pointed to the lack of providing conditions for effective human relations as a source of the trouble. For the purpose of this study the problems involving improper training or lack of technical training of personnel will not be considered, but attention will be centered on the inter-relationship of individuals. It is not intended to imply that there are no problems in the technical field, but they should be considered in a special study restricted to that particular class of problem.

It is the purpose of this study to try to determine whether or not the information possessed by petty officers about human relations is sufficient to permit them to handle their men in the most effective manner, and if not, to see if this is a cause contributing to the personnel problem; and thence to suggest a solution to the problem. As previously stated, such information can be obtained experimentally by the use of properly prepared questionnaires, which are filled out by members of the two groups--the petty officer group and the non-rated group. The opinions and attitudes discovered by means of the questionnaire can be compared and an indication obtained as to the agreement or disagreement of the two groups.

Before proceeding with such an investigation, it will be well to ask, "How is it possible to obtain indications of the existence of



good or bad human relations by use of a questionnaire?" This can be explained as follows.

Both in Navy and civilian life, the behavior of an individual is determined by the kind of person he is and the condition or situation he is in. An analysis of types of people and of conditions affecting the individual is therefore a means of understanding behavior. Individuals are members of groups--religious groups, members of a division, members of a coffee mess, or the gang that goes ashore together, et cetera. Within each group, individuals have likes, dislikes, feelings and loyalties toward each other. They want to experience the satisfaction that comes from being accepted and recognized as people who count for something by their friends and those with whom they associate on the job. Their likes, dislikes, feelings, loyalties, attitudes and opinions are influenced by several factors:

Background: This includes heredity, early environment, education, home conditions, financial status and the person's place in the community. Collectively, background includes most of the influences on the individual which originate off the job. While some idea of these influences can often be obtained from personnel records, a practical knowledge concerning a man would necessarily depend on personal relationships between the petty officer and the man.

Physical Conditions: The employee's attitude is influenced by any physical handicap which he may have, such as poor eyesight, defective hearing and chronic illness. It should be mentioned that he is even affected by some of these conditions which he thinks he has but which are actually non-existent.

The quality of working conditions, such as lighting, ventilation, layouts, sanitary facilities and occupational hazards have either a cheering or a depressing effect upon the workers.

Mental Conditions: These might involve nervous disorders, manic psychoses, et cetera. Only the milder forms of nervous disorders would usually be a factor in Naval personnel relations. The more serious cases would not normally be accepted by the service.

Psychological Conditions: The most outstanding of these conditions to worker relations are insecurity, anxiety, worry and fear. These may be described as health worries, financial worries, family worries and personality worries.<sup>1</sup> Often the majority of human relations problems come from this group of conditions, and they require much attention in the training of petty officers so the petty officers may be helped in dealing with them.

As mentioned earlier, a complete study of workers' attitudes and sentiments was made by the Western Electric Company at their Hawthorne plant.<sup>2</sup> The management of the Western Electric Company, Chicago, Illinois, believed that:

More adequate personnel work could be done if people whose daily duties consisted largely of dealing with human situations were trained to take account of the many factors which went into the determination of employee dissatisfaction and particularly to understand those complaints which were more symptoms of the complainant's situation than accurate statements of the particular interference or disability. The supervisory training program was therefore directed toward this end.<sup>3</sup>

The Hawthorne experiment revealed that there were many sources of complaints and reduced work effectiveness working on their employees.

<sup>1</sup>Training Supervisors in Human Relations, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, pp. 3 and 4.

<sup>2</sup>Management and the Worker, L. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 328



These were arranged under groups as follows:

Outside the Factory -- 1. Social Conditions.

Within the Factory -- 1. Physical Conditions of Work.  
2. Social Conditions of Work.

Within the Individual- 1. Organic Changes.  
2. Organism or Individual Equilibrium.  
3. Preoccupations.  
4. Personal History

All resulted in responses of (1) Complaints, and (2) Reduced work effectiveness. These factors were found to be interacting with no set sequence for all employees. There was, however, one point in common. There was a tendency on the part of complainants to project all their troubles on one object and in such terms to overthink their situations.<sup>1</sup>

A hypothesis was developed regarding individual disturbances of personnel equilibrium which reads as follows:

As the research continued, it seemed to the investigators that individual disturbances of personnel equilibrium could not be understood apart from the more general social setting at work in which the employee participated, for many complaints were expressing the interpersonal relations inherent in the social organization of workers, supervisors, and higher executives within the company. From interviewing supervisors there was a great deal of evidence to support this hypothesis. Stated briefly, the hypothesis is as follows:

- (1) that the attitudes of employees are regulated and controlled by a certain system of sentiments;
- (2) that this system of sentiments expresses the social organization of the employees, supervisors, and higher executives within the company;
- (3) that every feature and event in the working environment becomes an object of this system of sentiments; and

<sup>1</sup> Management and the Worker, F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, p. 327.



(4) that, therefore, in order to understand an employee's satisfactions or dissatisfactions with certain features or events in his working environment, it is necessary to understand these features or events in relation to their interactions with and effects upon

- (a) his position in the social organization of the company.
- (b) the social organization to which he has grown accustomed, i.e., the system of sentiments by means of which his position is defined, differentiated, and ordered from other positions, and
- (c) the demands which he is making of his work, as determined by his temperament and past social conditioning, or by the kind of relation he has to the wider community.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in industry it has been demonstrated that workers are largely governed by their sentiments and attitudes, and to understand a worker's satisfactions or dissatisfactions it is necessary to understand these factors. These are not factors that are peculiar to industry alone, and it is logical to assume that they apply to Naval personnel in like manner and with equal force. Therefore, by changing references to "factory," "employee" and "worker" in the above reasoning, to such terms as "Navy," and "personnel," the above hypothesis still seems valid. This hypothesis was used as a basis for investigating the human relations practiced by the petty officer group in the Navy, by means of a questionnaire<sup>2</sup> prepared so as to sample attitudes and sentiments of the petty officer group and the non-rated personnel. The results of the questionnaire were supplemented by interviewing the subjects who

<sup>1</sup> Management and the Worker, F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, pp. 358-359.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B

filled out the questionnaires as a group, and by this means additional sentiments and attitudes were obtained, together with suggestions for methods of using these attitudes and sentiments.

One of the factors in effective human relations, as listed on page 3 of this study was the formal organization of the particular institution. This factor should be discussed to clearly show its importance in the human relations problem and how human relations can be improved by clarifying the elements of the formal organization.

Again, it will be advisable to refer to definitions used in industry and then transfer the usable portions to the Naval Service. What is the formal organization that has been referred to? The formal organization has been nicely defined for an industrial plant in the following manner:

The social organization of the industrial plant is in part formally organized. It is composed of a number of strata or levels which differentiate the benchworker from the skilled mechanic, the group chief from the department chief, and so on. These levels are well defined and all the formal orders, instructions, and compensations are addressed to them. All such factors taken together make up the formal organization of the plant. It includes the systems, policies, rules, and regulations of the plant which express what the relations of one person to another are supposed to be in order to achieve effectively the task of technical production. It prescribes the relations that are supposed to obtain within the human organization and the technical organization. In short, the patterns of human interrelations, as defined by the systems, rules, policies, and regulations of the company, constitute the formal organization.<sup>1</sup>

In the above explanation of formal organization, the sentence that concerns our present discussion most is this: "It includes the systems, policies, rules and regulations of the plant which express what the relations of one person to another are supposed to be in order to achieve effectively the task of technical production."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Management and the Worker, L. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



This definition can be accepted in full and applied to the situation in the Navy with only one modification. Change that portion which reads: "to achieve effectively the task of technical production", so that it reads: "to achieve effective completion of the mission at hand." Thus the formal organization of the Navy has been defined.

The elements mentioned in the definition of the formal organization are terms that are generally understood; however, it will be well to define policies before proceeding with the discussion.

Policies have been defined as, "The guiding principles established by the company to govern actions, usually under repetitive conditions."<sup>1</sup>

These same authors further discuss policies:

It is important that policies be carefully and adequately expressed so that those in the organization will understand under what conditions and to what extent the rules are to apply. Further, since the policies are to cover actions in the future, and since man's memory is not infallible, it seems most important that the policies should not only be clearly expressed but that they be in writing.<sup>2</sup>

The reasons given for writing the policies are: that all will have the same interpretation of them; that they may be reviewed; that they may be checked for compliance and proper understanding; and that they will not become obscure through the passage of time.<sup>3</sup>

Again, the entire definition and the explanation can be adopted for Naval use. The Naval organization definitely has policies, rules, and directives, and for the reasons listed above it is important that each member of the organization know the policies that pertain to the individual. Therefore, the formal organization must arrange for

<sup>1</sup>Top-Management Organization and Control, Paul E. Holden, L. S. Fish, H. L. Smith, p. 79.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 79-80.

means for disseminating this information to the individuals, and checking to make sure that they are understood and reviewed.

If this one condition of human relations is weak or lacking, the best of inter-personal practices will be sorely handicapped because the two persons who are trying to work together may be operating under two different sets of rules unbeknownst to each other.

To determine whether or not advantage is taken of this condition of human relations, questions were asked of the petty officers, regarding the rules and laws set by Naval administration, with an attempt to determine how often they are reviewed and how often they are discussed with subordinate personnel concerned.

It must be recognized that the Navy is of necessity an autocracy and must be run on autocratic principles if it is to accomplish its mission of taking part in the preservation of a democracy. However, this does not mean that good inter-personal practices cannot be advantageously used in this type of organization.

Having explained and discussed the theory on which the present investigation was based, we can now give attention to the investigation itself.



## A Preliminary Study

The inter-personal relations of the petty officers and the non-rated men were investigated by means of two sets of questionnaires, one for each group.<sup>1</sup> The questions asked were in the main identical questions worded appropriately for each group. In preparing these questions, the hypothesis stated in the first part of this chapter<sup>2</sup> was used as a guide. This hypothesis states that a person's attitudes and sentiments largely govern his satisfactions and dissatisfactions with his working conditions. Therefore, an attempt was made to sample the attitudes and sentiments of the two groups by means of questions about subjects which were common to both groups, such as the relations existing between petty officers and non-rated men, matters of discipline, methods of discipline, assignment of work and tasks, et cetera. If the attitudes and sentiments were found to be in close agreement, it would be reasonable to assume that those groups could work together harmoniously. If there were evidences of lack of agreement, then it would be reasonable to assume that this difference in attitudes and sentiments could be a source of conflict between the groups.

Each questionnaire consisted of twenty-seven questions, some of which were factual and the rest were opinion questions. It is believed that the factual questions were appropriate, inasmuch as it was found that sometimes one group would say they acted or responded in a certain manner, while the other group stated that the first group acted or responded in a different manner. Thus a difference in opinion was demonstrated even about conditions that should have been fact.

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup>See page 13 above.



It was decided to make a pilot study as a preliminary to the final work in order that as many errors as possible might be eliminated. Therefore, arrangements were made at the Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, in May, 1948, to submit the questions to twenty-five petty officers and twenty-two non-rated personnel attached to that station. It was recognized that conditions at Naval Air Station, Glenview, were not ideal for a study of Naval personnel, due to the fact that the personnel on duty at the Glenview station were largely members of the United States Naval Reserve, and as such their attitudes might not be representative of Naval personnel in the active Navy. However, it was believed that this station would provide a test of the procedures and the questions. The petty officers who were used in the pilot study were station keepers on full-time duty at the Glenview station, all of whom had experienced service in the Naval establishment and had earned their rates while on active duty. The non-rated personnel who filled out the questionnaires were members of the Naval Reserve on full-time duty at the Glenview Naval Air Station.

The petty officer group consisted of men who held ratings from third class petty officer to and including first class petty officer. The station was requested to provide for the experiment non-rated men who had completed at least six months of service. This request was made in order to obtain a group that would not answer the questions from a strictly civilian point of view but would have had some acquaintance with Naval life. These men ranged from apprentice seamen to seaman and fireman first class. It was agreed that the names, rates, and duty assignments of the individuals participating in the experiment would not be taken, in an effort to obtain full cooperation of the men.

The rated men and the non-rated men were kept in separate groups and in separate rooms while the questionnaires were being filled out and during the interviews. The purpose of the study was explained to each group, and the men were invited to ask questions before answering the questionnaires, so that they would understand clearly what was desired. They were also informed that they were free to talk over the questions with their neighbors or ask questions at any time, but were requested to give their own opinions regardless of having discussed the questions with their neighbors.

It was found that the rated men seemed to have very little trouble with the questions and did very little talking until after the questionnaires had been filled out. The non-rated men did much more talking about the questions. It is believed this was due to the fact that some of them had trouble understanding what the questions meant.

It should be noted that on none of the questions asked was there total disagreement between the groups.<sup>1</sup> This is as it should be, and in fact the desirable condition is to have the agreement on all representative questions as close as possible. It would be almost impossible for people to work together in the event they did not agree on any of their opinions, sentiments and attitudes.

It might seem that we are working for absolute agreement on all questions. This is perhaps the ideal for smooth operation when problems are involved; however, if we are going to be practical about this study it should not be expected that this can be attained on any questions except very broad topics such as whether or not you think people need sleep for a continuation of their existence. On that, we would probably get complete agreement.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.



The comparison of the answers given by the two groups in the preliminary study showed that there was a lack of agreement on (1) consideration shown by petty officers in assigning jobs, (2) explanation of new jobs that are being assigned to non-rated men, (3) interest in the welfare of the non-rated men, (4) informing a non-rated man what he is being reprimanded for before he is bawled out, (5) showing men ways to avoid errors, (6) the preference of petty officers to criticize their men, (7) general criticism used by petty officers rather than specific criticism of non-rated men, and (8) methods of criticism. In comparing the agreement or disagreement of groups, it was felt that if there were more than ten per cent disagreement on a question there would be room for improvement.

Another consideration that is worth noting is the spread of answers within one particular group. It would seem that disagreement within the petty officer group on questions of policy and methods of handling men can be a source of misunderstanding and a means of providing confusion to the non-rated men. It will be noted that in answering some of the questions the petty officer group itself was badly divided, in some cases as many as half of the group being on each extreme.

Of the questions asked on the preliminary study, the two groups differed by more than ten per cent on almost two-thirds of the questions. Also, on almost one-third of the questions a large majority of the petty officer group disagreed as to the answers. These facts indicate that the sentiments and attitudes of the individual groups, as well as those of the petty officer group, are not in as close agreement as is desirable to promote harmonious working conditions.

Another questionnaire was submitted to these two groups. This set asked open-ending questions, such as, "What are the things that non-rated men do in relation to their work that you like?" and "What are the things that non-rated men do in relation to their work that you do not like?" It was planned to compare the responses obtained from such questions to see the similarity or dissimilarity of the sentiments and attitudes of the two groups. Almost all of these questionnaires were returned blank. When the members of the group were asked about possible answers, their hostility to such questions made it apparent that no useful purpose could be served by submitting this sort of question except in the interview situation and in the conference discussion meetings. Therefore, that type of question was discarded.

After the questionnaires had been filled out, each group was asked to remain and discuss the questions as an aid in improving them or eliminating improper questions and adding important ones that had been omitted. The non-rated group did not enter the discussion wholeheartedly but did confirm many of the questions asked on the blanks. A few of the men indicated that the petty officers seemed confused and not sure of what was expected of them. The men attributed this confusion to something that had gone wrong between the officers and the petty officers.

The petty officer group joined in a discussion enthusiastically and many ideas were presented by this group. The discussion was opened by the writer asking for an opinion on the questions--were they clear and did they hit any of the problems with which the petty officer is faced. The group unanimously condemned the open-ending questions,



stating that the questions just left them "cold." Therefore, that form of question was dropped from the discussion and an effort was made to get an idea of the type of question that the petty officers believed would provide a test of the attitudes and sentiments. Most of the group preferred the direct questions submitted and suggested that even more information could be obtained if an oral discussion were permitted. They believed that the questions generally indicated some of their problems, but--"the main trouble seems to be that we are just errand-boys for the officers; they do not back us up, so we don't know where we stand." "The non-rated men can tell us to go to the devil if they don't like a job we give them to do, and if we try to do anything about it, then they quit and we wind up doing the job ourselves and catch hell." This type of conversation indicated that there was a lack of understanding between the petty officers and the officers, a condition which points to one of the factors of human relations, the formal organization.

The petty officers were asked if they had any solutions to offer for the misunderstandings with the officers--had they talked such problems over to see what was the cause and to find a possible solution. The answer was that there had been no such conference. A few "gripe sessions" had been held between two or three of the petty officers, but they "wouldn't dare do more than that." They were then asked if they thought a conference of the petty officers in which they might discuss their problems, the rules under which they were working, and such common items might be helpful. This question met hesitating approval with some skepticism, and they asked what sort of thing could be discussed. As an example they were given the problem of cleanliness as practiced by the personnel. They were told that that was a problem concerning all of the

petty officers and they might be able to help each other by offering solutions that had been found to the various problems. One of the store-keepers took issue immediately with that problem, stating that it was no concern of his, for as long as his men kept their storerooms clean and did their work it was none of his business how they kept their lockers and clothes. Interestingly enough, one of the boatswain's mates took up the conversation and a lively discussion followed, which was joined by several of the other petty officers present. After about ten minutes discussion, the store-keeper of his own accord suggested that he had never before thought of the problem as it had been pointed out to him by his fellow petty officers in this discussion and that he guessed he was concerned with the cleanliness problem.

The discussion was stopped immediately and the attention of all hands was called to the possibility of solving other problems in this manner. They all seemed quite impressed with the idea, wondering why it had never occurred to them before. One of the petty officers then asked what good it would do them aside from just such problems, for their officers did not rely on them, and how far would they get suggesting rules and regulations. Again, they were referring to the formal organization of their relationships. Many times in the interviews they indicated insecurity, a lack of recognition, and a feeling of not belonging to the outfit. The writer thought this was probably a local condition caused by the lack of rigid military discipline, a condition which is possible in an organization where the members are free to quit at any time they desire, and the job is not one on which the man depends for his living.



It should be noted that this study at the Naval Air Station, Glenview, was made before the Selective Service Act of 1948 was passed by Congress. This law should reduce the discipline problem on Naval Reserve stations.

Attention is called to the fact that this report on both the preliminary study and the final study will discuss only the adverse opinions, attitudes and sentiments that were discovered in the investigation. The results of the questionnaires indicated that there are many agreements on attitudes and opinions; however, these are not the ones that cause the problem and therefore need not be discussed.

## The Experimental Procedures

The information obtained by the preliminary study confirmed the fact that there was definitely, at least at the Naval Air Station, Glenview, a lack of agreement in the sentiments and attitudes of the petty officer and the non-rated groups. The results of the preliminary study also indicated that part of the explanation for the lack of agreement between the groups might be found in the formal organization. A few changes were made in the questionnaire<sup>1</sup> and as many as possible of the mistakes made in the preliminary study were eliminated. Plans were then made to conduct the final study at the Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois, during June, 1948.

Arrangements were made for the study to be conducted through the Educational Services Office at the Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois. An attempt was made to assemble about one hundred petty officers and have all the questionnaires filled out at one time. If the study were to be a success, a great deal of cooperation would be necessary on the part of those participating; therefore, it was decided to use only those who volunteered to answer questions and be interviewed. Because of their experience and because they would have what may be called Naval opinions and attitudes, the most desirable persons to participate would be those who were actually in charge of non-rated men and who had had sea duty. Due to the fact that the petty officers were not detailed for this task, it was possible to get only about sixteen together for the first attempt to have the questionnaire filled out. This group proved most cooperative, and the discussion that followed the

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix B.



questionnaire proved much more valuable than it would have been had the group been a larger one. The rest of the questionnaires were given to petty officers for completion at their convenience, a situation which hindered interviewing these participants.

An attempt was made to have the questions for non-rated personnel filled out by men other than recruits. This proved quite a problem due to the scarcity of such non-rated personnel on duty at that station. It was decided that men should have been in the Navy a minimum of six months or their attitudes and sentiments would be of practically no value for this study. This situation made it almost impossible to get a group of non-rated men together at one time. Therefore, non-rated men who had suitable length of service and who would be willing to assist in this study were selected, and the questionnaires were given to these men individually. This provided so few men and so little opportunity to interview them that arrangements were made to interview and question the non-rated men who were reporting to the Service School Command at the Great Lakes Naval Training Station for instruction. These people were expressing opinions, attitudes and sentiments that they brought from their former duty stations, which in all cases was sea duty. Interestingly enough, a few of their attitudes and sentiments seemed to be different from those expressed by the non-rated men who had been attached to the Training Station for some time. This demonstrates the fact that a person's attitudes and sentiments are affected by the work situation.

Information about the petty officers and non-rated men who participated in the study is given below in Tables I through VII.

TABLE I.

Number of Petty Officers, by Rates, Participating in the Study

<u>Rate</u>	<u>Number</u>
Aviation Structural Machinist	
First Class	1
Boatswain's Mate	
First Class	6
Second Class	3
Third Class	1
Commissarymen	
First Class	7
Second Class	3
Third Class	1
Damage Controlmen	
Third Class	3
Pharmacist's Mates	
Second Class	2
Third Class	1
Enginemen	
First Class	1
Second Class	2
Hospitalmen	
First Class	5
Second Class	5
Third Class	2
Machinist's Mate	
First Class	1
Metalsmith	
First Class	2
Personnel Men	
Second Class	2
Quartermaster	
First Class	3
	1
Stowards	
First Class	1
Storekeepers	
First Class	2
Second Class	2
Ship's Servicemen	
First Class	1
Telemen	
First Class	1
Second Class	1
Yeomen	
Second Class	2
Unspecified	1



TABLE II.

Length of Service of Petty Officers Participating in the Study

<u>Months</u>	<u>Number of Petty Officers</u>
30 - 39	2
40 - 49	7
50 - 59	5
60 - 69	3
70 - 79	5
80 - 89	3
90 - 99	7
100 -109	4
110 -119	1
120 or over	9

TABLE III.

Length of Service as Petty Officers of Petty Officers Participating in the Study

<u>Months as Petty Officer</u>	<u>Number of Petty Officers</u>
Under 24	2
25 - 29	5
30 - 39	6
40 - 49	6
50 - 59	7
60 - 69	5
70 - 79	5
80 - 89	6
90 - 99	3
100 -109	1
160	1

TABLE IV.

Age of Petty Officers Participating in the Study

<u>Age in years</u>	<u>Number of Petty Officers</u>
20 - 21	5
22 - 23	9
24 - 25	9
26 - 27	8
28 - 29	6
30 - 31	5
32 - 33	1
34 - 35	4

TABLE V.Rates of Non-Petty Officer (Non-Rated) Men Participating in the Study

<u>Rate</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>
Seaman Apprentice	3
Seaman	10
Fireman Apprentice	8
Fireman	3
YNOSN	2

TABLE VI.Length of Service of Non-Rated Men Participating in the Study

<u>Months</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>
6 - 9	5
10 - 14	7
15 - 19	2
20 - 24	1
25 - 29	5
30 - 34	4
35 - 39	1
40 - 44	0
45 - 49	1

TABLE VII.Age of Non-Rated Men Participating in the Study

<u>Age in Years</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>
17	1
18 - 19	15
20 - 21	5
22 - 23	3
24 - 25	1
26 - 27	0
28 - 29	1



It is believed that the members of each group cooperated to the fullest extent in answering the questions. This was particularly apparent in those who were interviewed. They seemed interested in the subject of the study and were anxious to give information.

The final questionnaire<sup>1</sup> was similar to the one used for the pilot study. Almost all the questions used on the first form were used on the final set, and to these were added questions which had been suggested as a result of the pilot study, and others that it was thought would be informative. As in the pilot study, each group was asked identical questions which were appropriately worded for each group; however, the number of questions was increased to sixty-three. In addition, the petty officers were asked five additional questions regarding their relations to the management of the unit to which they were attached. These five questions were results of the interviews conducted in the pilot study which indicated a weakness in the formal organization. It was a mistake to increase the number of questions from twenty-seven to sixty-three because boredom and loss of interest developed.

If the study were to be made again, the number of questions would be reduced to thirty or thirty-five, and it is believed that even better results would be obtained. The majority of questions asked were of the opinion type; however, a few factual questions were included. It was believed that these were appropriate for the same reasons that have been mentioned for using factual questions in the pilot study.

The questions were written so that they pertained to the areas of praise and constructive criticism or blame as a tool in the hands of a supervisor, social manners of a supervisor, the supervisor as a teacher, problems of a supervisor in maintaining morale, the open door policy in supervision, and the supervisor's responsibilities.

See Appendix B for complete sets of questions.

The answers to the questions on the questionnaires were totaled in such a manner that the total number of persons giving each possible answer were indicated. The percentage of the total answers given to each question by each group was then computed so that the relative popularity of each possible answer could be easily shown. The results of this computation for each question are shown in Appendix B. The percentages for each answer for both the petty officer group and the non-rated men group are shown on the same page as a means of easy comparison of the total attitudes of the two groups.

As has been mentioned, both the petty officer group and the non-rated men were interviewed whenever such arrangements were possible. For the petty officer group the interviews were handled as follows: The first group of sixteen were interviewed as a body after the questionnaires had been filled out. The group were asked about their opinion of the study, and from there on the conversation was left to the members of the group, the interviewer only guiding the conversation back to the desired areas of discussion whenever extraneous matters were brought up. This was the only group of petty officers interviewed. Several petty officers were individually interviewed after they had completed filling out the questionnaire. The interview was handled in the same manner for individuals as it was for the group.

The non-rated men were interviewed in groups of two or three and individually. The same procedure was used in these interviews as was used for the petty officers. However, in several cases the men were asked to discuss questions as they filled out the questionnaires. In this manner they would explain their ideas, and in some cases it was noted that when talking about a subject they would actually explain



a problem differently than they would answer the same question on the questionnaire. It was found that the groups of two or three, when interviewed, did not encourage individual thinking, for whenever one member offered a suggestion the other member immediately would back the first man up, which suggested that the men desired uniformity of opinion at any cost when the group was small.

## Presentation of the Results

After the questionnaires had been filled out and the interviews completed, the results were carefully analyzed for any conclusions that could be drawn. The results of these two procedures will be discussed individually. First, we will consider the tendencies or trends that seemed to be indicated by the questionnaires within one group, or between the two groups.

1. Considering the answers of the petty officer group only, it was noted that on thirty-six questions, or about fifty-three per cent of the total number of questions, there was no decided opinion expressed for the group. For example, sixty per cent might say "Yes," and forty per cent "No." If it was multiple-choice, answers might be divided in equal numbers for each possible choice. This failure to indicate a common answer to the question would indicate one or a combination of several causes. Such a wide spread in the selection of answers might be caused by the lack of policy, established method, or doctrine having been laid down and taught to the petty officers. Such a lack would permit the petty officers to respond in an unguided manner or as learned in a previous situation. Another possible cause of the wide spread in the selection of answers could be that various commands are teaching different methods which have developed a wide spread in the attitudes and sentiments of the petty officers. Another reason may be that commands have not realized the importance of guiding the attitudes and sentiments of their petty officers so that the most useful attitudes and sentiments are developed; therefore, the common human relations policies of the Navy have not been taught to the petty officers.



It seems unlikely, after considering the questions on the questionnaire, that some of the answers given would have been taught by any command; therefore, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the petty officers are largely left to their own resources to develop their attitudes and sentiments regarding human relations problems. As an example, one of the questions on the questionnaire was: "To what extent is it a good thing for a petty officer to be in doubt regarding the character, scope and limits of his responsibility and authority?" Twenty-four per cent of the petty officers said it was always a good thing for him to be in doubt. Ten per cent said usually; three per cent said about half the time; twenty per cent said rarely, and forty-three per cent said never. It is unlikely that any command would teach petty officers that it is desirable for them to be in doubt about their responsibilities and authority. Therefore, we must conclude that ineffective instruction, or none at all, is given when petty officers indicate that it is desirable for them to be in doubt as to their responsibilities and authority.

This same type of spread was noted in the answers given to some of the questions by the non-rated group. Such a spread in this group may be expected due to their lack of training in human relations and lack of experience under the policies of the Navy.

2. A comparison of the answers given for each question by the two groups indicated a difference of opinions and attitudes between the groups. It was felt that if the two groups differed in their opinion by ten percent or more there was a practical significant difference, even though it might not be statistically significant. The interest should obviously be in the questions which showed differences

much larger than ten per cent, but for the purpose of a starting point in the comparison the ten per cent was arbitrarily chosen, and it seems to be a reasonable figure. A comparison of the answers given by the two groups showed that there was a significant difference in the opinions and attitudes of the two groups on about fifty-seven per cent of the questions. The questions on which the two groups significantly disagreed were about such subjects as the following:

1. The amount of praise and criticism given non-rated men by petty officers.
2. Whether or not the criticisms given by petty officers is of a general or specific nature.
3. Whether or not praise by petty officers will cause non-rated men to expect special consideration and favors.
4. Whether or not reprimands can be given in such a way as to increase interest in the job at hand.
5. Whether or not it is necessary for a man to admit a mistake before he can be expected to improve.
6. Whether or not a petty officer should "make an example" of a non-rated man.
7. The best time of day for administering a serious criticism.
8. Whether or not petty officers should tease and joke with their non-rated men during working hours.
9. Whether or not petty officers should borrow money from non-rated men.
10. Whether mistakes in judgment or intentional mistakes by non-rated men irritate petty officers most.
11. Whether or not petty officers give credit for suggestions to the one who made the suggestions.
12. Reasons for giving credit for suggestions that are accepted.
13. Whether or not petty officers should be in doubt about their authority and responsibilities.



14. Whether or not it is desirable to let non-rated men learn by their mistakes.
15. Whether petty officers who are consistently strict, consistently lenient, or a combination of both, get the best results from their men.
16. Matters of disloyalty to petty officers.
17. Should the petty officer be a peacemaker?
18. Taking up matters of disagreement with the division officer.
19. Procedure to follow in the event a non-rated man goes over the head of his petty officer.
20. Consideration shown by petty officers when assigning difficult jobs.
21. The extent to which new jobs are explained.
22. The amount of interest shown by the petty officer in the welfare of his men.
23. Whether or not the petty officer should be interested in what his men do when they are on liberty.
24. Whether or not petty officers give praise the way the non-rated men like to have it given.
25. Expressing opinions about plans.

It seems reasonable that persons who are working together and have such differences in attitudes and opinions are provided plenty of opportunity for friction unless the petty officers are trained to recognize the attitudes of those who work for and with them and know how to use those attitudes constructively. Frequently the attitudes can be molded or modified; however, it is probably easier to learn to work with attitudes or to place them in positions where they are not in violent conflict with others. In the event the disagreement between groups is not extreme, for instance, a fifteen per cent disagreement, it must be considered that there is a chance that men from this fifteen

per cent group may be trying to work with men from the larger group who look at the question in another manner. Even with this small amount of disagreement it should be worth while, when considering the completion of the task at hand, to have it completed the easiest and most pleasant way possible for the good of all concerned. Therefore, training which will bring even small numbers of men into better working conditions will be profitable.

3. The analysis of the answers to the questions gave some indication that the attitudes, sentiments and opinions of the petty officer group and non-rated group tended to be the same in some cases. This is to be expected, and as has been previously mentioned the desirable situation is to approach agreement in attitudes and sentiments of people who must work together, which means the development of the ability to appreciate and understand the other fellow's attitudes. However, in this study it was noted that many of the non-rated men who participated were doing work that was similar to work done by petty officers. In fact, in some cases the non-rated men would relieve the petty officers at the change of the watch. Such a situation would probably influence the attitudes and opinions of the non-rated man so that his attitudes and opinions would correspond more closely to those of petty officers than to those of non-rated men who were not performing petty officers' duties. This situation became especially apparent when interviewing the non-rated men who had just reported to the station from other commands and who had not performed petty officer duties. Statements made by them frequently differed from answers given by the old-time station non-rated man. This situation will be discussed more fully later in the study when the interviews are considered. This



similarity of duties may have been enough to influence the overall opinions and attitudes expressed by the non-rated men so that a similar experiment conducted on a ship or station not experiencing this situation would result in a more violent disagreement of attitudes and sentiments of the two groups.

4. The questionnaire prepared for the petty officers use contained several questions which pertained to the petty officer as a member of the management of the Navy. The answers to these questions indicated a lack of feeling of belonging to management on the part of the petty officers. Questions numbers 23, 33, 34, 64, 65, 66 and 67 were of this type and will be discussed in that order. The first question referred to the petty officer being in doubt about the character, scope and limits of his responsibility and authority and has been discussed in a previous paragraph. It must be remembered that twenty-four per cent of the petty officers indicated on this question that they should always be in doubt regarding responsibility and authority. If these men are a part of management, and we have seen that they are, then it will be shown that they must all know their responsibilities and authority.<sup>1</sup> Another management question was: In the absence of his immediate superior, what should a petty officer do about making decisions of the type which his superior is accustomed to make? Thirty-four per cent indicated that such matters should be referred to a still higher authority; fifty per cent indicated that he should make the decision himself; and sixteen per cent indicated that he should try to avoid a decision until his immediate superior returns, even though the work will probably suffer a little. It is obvious that an answer to such a question will depend upon the conditions existing in

<sup>1</sup>See page 37 below.

the particular situation. However, if the petty officer identifies himself with management, normally he will answer such a question as did fifty per cent of the petty officers in this study--that he should make the decision himself. It must be remembered that this left fifty per cent of those asked who felt otherwise, and these people probably do not identify themselves with management. The following question was answered in the most favorable manner in almost all cases. If there is friction between two non-rated men in the division which might lower the morale or the standards of work, should the petty officer try to iron out their difficulties? Ninety-four per cent of the petty officers indicated that they should always or usually iron out the difficulties.

The petty officers were asked: To what extent do you believe the petty officers are a part of the management group of the Navy? It is interesting that eighty-five per cent of them believed they are all definitely a part of management; three per cent believed that only chief petty officers are a part of management; five per cent believed that only a few of the petty officers are a part of management; and seven per cent believed that none of the petty officers are part of management. They were asked next: To what extent do you think an effort is made by the officers to make the petty officers feel they are a part of the management of the Navy? Thirty-one per cent believed an honest effort is made to make them feel they are a part of management; twenty-two per cent indicated that some effort is made; thirty-seven per cent indicated that very little effort is made; and ten per cent indicated that no effort is made to make the petty officers feel they are a part of management.



Here we have almost all of the petty officers believing they are a part of management. However, the percentages given above seem to indicate that about half of these people believe that they are not accepted as a part of management by the management itself. This belief was confirmed in the interviews conducted both in the pilot study and in the final study. Such a situation cannot be conducive to good management practices on the part of the petty officers.

The petty officers were also asked: To what extent is the necessity for rules and orders explained to you at the time they are issued to you for transmittal to your non-rated men and for compliance? Also, to what extent are the rules and orders themselves explained to you at the time they are issued to you for transmittal to your non-rated men and for compliance? On both questions less than fifty per cent of the petty officers believed that an explanation was always given to them; about forty per cent believed that explanations were given sometimes; about fifteen per cent believed that explanations were seldom given; and about six per cent believed that they were never given. If people are a part of management, they must know the rules and should know the reasons for them if they are expected to support those rules and see that others live up to them.

It is recognized that not all orders will be explained at the time they are given, and in naval organization it would not be desirable to do so. Orders of major importance definitely should be explained either at the time they are given or as soon afterwards as is convenient, in order that the petty officers may thoroughly understand them and have a feeling of participation in their establishment. Minor orders properly given obviously need not be explained, as making such an

explanation would leave no opportunity for initiative on the part of the petty officer and would deprive him of the feeling of belonging to management. Hereafter, this meaning of explanation of rules and orders will be used in this study.

The answers to all of these questions that have been discussed, except one, have indicated a weakness in the formal organization as we have defined it.<sup>1</sup> As has been previously stated, we cannot expect the best practices of human relations to be used when the people who should use them are in doubt about their status and what the rules mean and why they are necessary.

It was believed that if the petty officers considered themselves a part of the management of the Navy, they should then know where to find the rules and regulations that pertained to them and to the people they were supervising. Therefore, they were asked to list the Naval publications, books, orders, letters, et cetera, that they considered contain the rules and regulations that govern the petty officer on his job. They were also asked to indicate when they last read such book, order or letter, and when they had last discussed it with those who work for them and are concerned with those rules. These questions were called to the attention of the petty officers at the time the questionnaires were handed out. Despite this precaution, only forty-eight per cent of the petty officers who participated in the study listed any publications. At the time the questionnaires were returned by the petty officers many were asked

<sup>1</sup> See page 15, above.



why they had not answered that part. Some said they did not know any such publications, while others said they had failed to notice that page of the questionnaire. It is hoped that the latter case was more typical. There is probably not a man in the Navy who has not at least heard of Navy Regulations, Plan of the Day, and local Station Orders, but it is interesting to note how few petty officers--who are a part of management--thought of such publications when asked where to find rules that govern them. This would seem to indicate that these men are not too familiar with the bases for the rules that pertain to them. It is not implied that they should learn everything in basic publications, but they should know about those parts that concern them and where rules can be found if they should want to find them.

A complete listing of the books, letters, pamphlets and publications given by the petty officers grouped according to the rate of the petty officer is shown in Appendix B. It is recognized that each department will have some rules peculiar to that department; however, there should be a number of basic rules common to all people in the Navy. No such common group of basic rules was shown in the listing of publications. The total list of publications mentioned by the petty officers, together with the number of times each publication was mentioned, is shown in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII.

Publications Listed by Petty Officers as Containing Basic Rules of the Navy

	<u>Publication Listed</u>	<u>Number of Persons Listing It</u>
A	A to N	1
	All Hands Magazine	12
	Alnavs	6
	Apprentice Seaman's Manual	1
	Artificer's Book	1
	Articles for the Government of the Navy	2
B	Blue Jacket's Manual	4
	Bulletin Board Notices	1
	BuPers Manual	6
	Bureau of Personnel Circular Letters	2
	Bureau of S. & A. Manual	3
C	Commissary Bulletins	1
	Communication Instruction	1
	Circular Letters	6
	Correspondence Manual	2
	Course Books	3
	Courts and Boards	1
	Court Martial Orders	1
F	Filing Manual	1
G	General Orders	2
I	Instructions for Recruiting Service	1
J	JANAF (various)	1
K	Knight's Modern Seamanship	1
M	Manual of Qualifications for Advancement in Rate	1
	Manuals	1
	Medical Manuals and Books	2
	Memoranda of Superior Officers	1
N	Navacts	1
	Navy Regulations	6
	Navy Digest	1
	Navy Department Bulletins	2
	Navy Travel Instructions	2
	Naval Training Bulletin	1
	Ninth Naval District Newsletter	1
O	Our Navy (magazine)	5
P	P.S.C. Book	1
	Plan of the Day	3
	Pub. Informer	1
R	Requirements for Petty Officers	1
S	S.E.A. Editor's Manual	1
	Semi-Annual Bulletins	1
	Standard Stock Catalogue	1
	Stevedoring and Rigging	1
T	Times	1
	Training Courses and Bulletins	3



In listing these publications, the titles given by the petty officers are used in the listing and only those publications that are obviously the same are grouped together. It will be noted that no publications were selected by all of the petty officers, and there was not even a group of publications that the majority tended to consider basic. It is interesting that All Hands magazine and Our Navy magazine are thought of as basic publications almost more than Navy Regulations itself.

This seems to be conclusive evidence that the formal organization has failed to provide knowledge of the policies, rules and procedures by which we expect the petty officers to govern themselves and guide those who are working for them. It cannot be a stabilizing or unifying situation. How do we know that these petty officers are trying to work by the same rules?

The attempt to determine when these publications were last studied and when last discussed with non-rated men must be considered a complete failure statistically. Few of those who listed publications at all made any mention of the reading or discussion. The few remarks that were made ranged from "often" to "never." No usable information was obtained from this part of the question, except that apparently the publications are seldom reviewed and practically never discussed with subordinates.

The questionnaire has indicated evidence of failure to discuss rules with and explain them to the petty officers. In addition to this evidence provided by the questionnaire, two experiences can be cited to further support the belief that formal organization is not as effective as it should be as a foundation for effective human relations.

When this study was being planned, a group of commissioned officers was asked during a conversation if they believed rules should be discussed with and explained to their petty officers. The general opinion of the group was that if the men are petty officers they are capable of reading, so why is that necessary. If they can't read, they should not be petty officers. It is not to be implied that this is the universal attitude in the Navy, but it must be recognized that at least one group felt that way. Such an attitude certainly does not help make a man feel he is a part of management.

This same lack of indoctrination of petty officers when rules are established is also indicated by an undesirable practice which the writer used some years ago when serving in a light cruiser. The Commanding Officer established his rules and regulations through published Captain's Orders. At least half of these orders pertained to the enlisted personnel and should have been thoroughly understood and supported by them. Each officer received a personal copy of all orders, and copies were also posted on the bulletin board. The writer's file was kept very neat and absolutely complete and carefully filed in a drawer in his room. The petty officers were expected to get the word from the bulletin board and actively support the rules and regulations so published. Actually, they should read bulletin boards, but like most human beings they did not read them too carefully. Therefore, many incidents occurred where non-rated and rated men violated the rules and found themselves in trouble. The only thing for the division officer to do was to ask, "Didn't you read the bulletin board?" When we consider the facts, this is certainly a poor excuse--poor human relations. How much better it would have been had the file been used to teach the petty officers what



was expected of them. This situation was true of not only the writer's division. About the same conditions existed in each division on the ship, and about the same number of men from each division were on report.

The results obtained from the answers to the questions used in this study did not prove as exaggerated as had been expected. It was expected that the difference in opinions would be even more pronounced than this study revealed. Probably better results would be obtained from questions prepared by experts. Another item that probably weakened the results was the fact that time did not permit re-doing the experiment when mistakes were discovered. Perhaps the sampling of attitudes on a ship, or station other than a training center, would indicate wider variation of attitudes.

### The Interviews

After the first group of petty officers had completed the questionnaire, they all participated in a discussion of the attitudes and opinions of the group. Other petty officers were asked about their attitudes and opinions as time and conditions permitted. Probably less than one-half of the petty officers participating in the study were interviewed; nevertheless, some interesting opinions were expressed.

The petty officers interviewed in both the pilot study and in this final study were most cooperative and seemed anxious to talk about their problems. In both studies they immediately guided the conversation to the relationship existing between the petty officers and the commissioned officers. Interestingly enough, the attitudes of the petty officers in the two groups were expressed in almost the same manner.

The conversation was usually opened by asking the petty officers if they thought they had any problems in the relationships that existed between them and the non-rated men. In almost every case they answered, "Our main problem is trying to get treated like petty officers; we can get along with the men, but the officers can't see us." At first an attempt was made to return the conversation to the relationship existing between the petty officers and the non-rated men, but each time it was returned to the petty officer-officer relationship, so it was decided to let them express themselves in this area.

A few statements seemed to summarize their discussions and



these were written down during the interviews:

1. "If we could get the backing of the officers, then we could really be petty officer."
2. "If we could really believe and feel that the officers respected us and trusted us--!"
3. "If we could know that the officers had confidence in us and depended on us--."
4. "The flat hat doesn't amount to a thing in this Navy."
5. "The Navy is just for the officers--it's an officers' Navy."

It is surprising how frequently petty officers said, "If only the officers would treat us as they would like to be treated if they were in our position."

After hearing these and similar statements many times, it became evident that the petty officers were indicating a feeling of insecurity and a lack of the feeling of belonging to the outfit. Perhaps some of these petty officers were not worthy of confidence due to lack of technical training or to past performance, but after hearing similar remarks from many different people it seems impossible that they are all unworthy of confidence and trust.

Such attitudes as those expressed above do not permit the petty officer to be effective as a part of management. He must feel that he is trusted, depended upon, and that he is a part of the management with authority and responsibility.

The petty officers were also asked if they thought a conference of petty officers held at frequent intervals might help their situation. It was suggested that at those conference their common problems might be discussed and perhaps solutions found. The petty officers doubted that this would be effective due to their belief that the officers did not

back them up, trust them, or have confidence in them. After some discussion, the various petty officers were of the opinion that such a procedure might help. Some definite results would have to be shown to keep up the interest of the participants, and they would definitely have to be sold on the idea.

Several of the petty officers did indicate that they had participated in informal discussions with their shipmates in which they had talked over some of their individual problems. They said that the conferences had never had official sanction and they had discussed only minor problems currently of interest to the two or three present, but that the discussions seemed to have helped them handle the situation when it came up the next time.

About one-half of the non-rated men who participated in the study were interviewed. These interviews were with either groups of from two to four or with individuals alone. The men talked freely of their opinions and seemed anxious to give their ideas and suggestions. Some of the typical opinions that were expressed were written down during the interviews and are given here as nearly like the original statement as possible:

1. If petty officers would help you out a little more--just explain things better.
2. If petty officers would forget that they had rates and chip in once in a while.
3. They should act the same as non-rated men--they take their rates too seriously.
4. If they would treat the non-rated man as they would like to be treated themselves.
5. The petty officers will let the important things go by and pick on you for the small things.
6. It would be better if petty officers could get along better with each other--less rivalry.



7. Petty officers expect you to know a job and don't explain it or seem to care whether you know how to do it or not.
8. The third class petty officers let their rates go to their heads so often--they use excessive bossing around.
9. Sometimes the first class petty officers are too anxious to make chief and really get bossy. This may be a natural trait but I don't like it.
10. The petty officer should ask you to do something before he orders you to do it.

A group of three who had been in submarines offered the following: "In subs you have good human relations--everyone is willing to help you out, and if he isn't willing to help the other fellow he gets off the ship. Your petty officers are always anxious to be told about what is wrong and they do something about it."

As has been explained previously, due to the difficulty of using station personnel, arrangements were made to interview the non-rated men who were reporting to the Service School Command from the fleet. In the interviews an effort was made to compare the answers given by the group who had just returned from sea duty with those of the station non-rated men. There were a few differences of opinions that were interesting and may indicate further the desirability of conducting this experiment using shipboard personnel.

The group just returning from sea indicated that it was possible to give reprimands in such a manner that you would feel more enthusiastic after the reprimand than before. However, they stated almost unanimously that it was seldom done that way. The station non-rated man group was split almost equally, one half indicating that reprimands could be given in this manner while the other half indicated that they could not be given in this manner.

The ship group thought it was not necessary to make a man admit a mistake to get him to improve, while the station group was divided equally on this point. The ship group thought that the cause of too few questions while non-rated men are being instructed by their petty officers was the fact that they had not been paying attention; the station group felt that they did not realize their need for the instruction. One half of the ship group indicated that the petty officers gave them credit for their suggestions, while the other half thought that the petty officers did not give them credit for suggestions they made. The station group indicated that credit is always or usually given for suggestions. These latter points may demonstrate the fact that the station non-rated men were doing petty officer tasks. The ship group said petty officers did not consider how a job might affect a man before assigning it to him, while the station group usually indicated that the petty officers did consider this fact. The ship group thought that the reasons for reprimands were explained less frequently than did the station group; also, the ship group almost unanimously believed that petty officers would rather criticize a non-rated man than praise him, while sixty per cent of the station group believed that petty officers would rather praise than criticize the non-rated men.

It will be noted that many of these examples indicate a difference between the men returning from sea and those who had been on duty at the station for some time where they were doing work similar to that of petty officers. This indicates that the attitudes and opinions of the men are influenced by their work and surroundings.

These interviews pointed to areas where attitudes and opinions differed between the non-rated man and the petty officer. In



some cases, the men became quite emphatic about their opinions and even seemed to reverse the answers given on the questionnaire. This may have been due to the wording of the questions, or perhaps the questions were not carefully read when they were being answered. As a whole, the interviews seemed to indicate a greater difference of attitudes and opinions between the non-rated men and the petty officers than did the questionnaires.

Both the questions and the interviews have indicated a difference of opinion and attitude between the two groups being studied. It is not believed that this difference in attitude and opinion indicates a fault of any one station or ship, and it is not intended to criticize the stations on which the studies were made. It is believed that this situation is common throughout the Navy, and is one that needs prompt and vigorous attention.

### The Proposed Plan

The results of this study have shown how effective human relations are being impeded at the petty officer non-rated man level in the Navy. It has also been shown that there is need for training in the practice of good human relations on the part of the petty officers in the Navy. Having recognized the areas in which corrections are needed, it is now necessary to propose a way of correcting the deficiencies.

Probably the most reasonable way to select a program is to determine first what is desired of the program; next, what means are available for accomplishing this; and then to select the most likely program.

It is desired to improve the conditions effecting good human relations in the Navy and to show the petty officers how to practice human relations more successfully. To do this we must know what human relations concern a petty officer, and this in turn must await our knowing what a petty officer does and is. Perhaps you may feel that this is now a waste of your time, for you have worked with petty officers all these years and you certainly know what one is; but wait and consider it in this manner. Any number of definitions could be given for a petty officer, and perhaps this one will be acceptable to all; "A person responsible for work."<sup>1</sup> This is too general to tell us much about the petty officer as far as what we should expect of him and to provide a help in determining what we can teach him regarding human relations, but that seems to be as far as a lot of us consider the petty officer. The petty officer's position in the Navy is about the same as the position of the foreman in industry. A foreman's creed has been written which lists most of the qualities that are expected of the petty officer, and therefore we can use it as an analysis of that group of people.

<sup>1</sup>Training for Supervision in Industry, George H. Fern, p. 7.



## Foreman's Guide and Creed<sup>1</sup>

1. Understand and carry out all company policies and procedures.
2. Know where the work for which I am responsible stands at all times.
3. Be constantly alert to see that quality standards are maintained and methods improved.
4. Go out of my way to help others.
5. See that the person above me in supervision line is informed as to what goes on and check with him if I'm in doubt.
6. Keep an open mind on ideas, methods, people and problems.
7. Stand on my own feet and not pass the buck.
8. Follow up my instructions to see they are carried out.
9. Develop and build those under me so that I shall always have an understudy.
10. Meet each day's problems cheerfully, with patience, persistence, reasonableness and understanding.
11. Take a personal interest in those who work for me, making a friendly contact at least once a day.
12. Explain all company programs and policies to those who work for me.
13. Get and keep the confidence of those who work for me so they will always feel free to come to me with their problems or misunderstandings.
14. Play no favorites.
15. Get all the facts and not jump at conclusions.
16. Give full credit to others when it is deserved.
17. Never discipline a person in front of others.
18. Sell quality of workmanship and safety every day.
19. Never promise things I can't deliver.
20. Treat the other fellow the way I should like to be treated in his place.

<sup>1</sup>Common Sense of Management and Labor, B. H. Hammond, talk before Whiting Corporation, Harvey, Illinois, November 7, 1947.

This creed was written for industry, but we can substitute Naval terms for those used in industry and the list, if followed exactly, would provide a petty officer who would be just about what this study indicates is desired. In fact, unless every level in the chain of supervision strives to meet this creed there will be little chance of developing it in the lower levels.

So far we have seen what we desire to create in our petty officers through some training program, but there is another side to the question. Little can be accomplished toward obtaining what we desire if we do not consider what factors affect the petty officer, and what he desires.

Dr. A. C. Van Dusen, Associate Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University, in his lecture to a seminar on personnel psychology on May 19, 1948, said that all people are striving to satisfy their physiological and psychological needs. The psychological needs are especially important in everyday adjustment and consist primarily of: (1) The need for a feeling of security, and (2) The need for a feeling of adequacy and independence.<sup>1</sup> Security embraces (1) affection, (2) response, (3) belongingness, and (4) sensory gratification. Adequacy includes (1) achievement and (2) recognition of accomplishment. All of these factors must be kept in balance or a person will become unstable. Also, all of these factors are important and are considered more or less by all persons who do personnel work; however, for our purpose let us consider the security needs of the petty officer, particularly response and belongingness, to make sure that our training

<sup>1</sup> Personal Problems of Everyday Life, Travis and Baruch, pp. 64 and 73.



program covers them adequately.

Subordinates are dependent upon their superior for the satisfaction of their needs.<sup>1</sup> These needs include the job, the man's rate, his responsibilities, prestige, and a host of other personal and social satisfactions to be obtained in a work situation. This is true of the petty officer as well as of the supervisor in industry. The subordinate will struggle to protect himself against real or imagined threats to the satisfaction of his needs in the work situation. Before subordinates can believe that it is possible to satisfy their wants in the work situation, they must acquire a convincing sense of security in their dependent relationships to their superiors. There are three aspects of the subordinate-superior relationship--at any level of the organization--which affect the security of the subordinate: (1) an atmosphere of approval. This atmosphere is revealed not by what the superior does but by the manner in which he does it, and by his underlying attitude toward his subordinates. It is relatively independent of the strictness of the superior's discipline, or the standards of performance which he demands. (2) The second requirement for the subordinate's security is knowledge. He must know what is expected of him. Otherwise he may interfere with the satisfaction of his own needs. There are several kinds of knowledge which the subordinate requires:

- a. knowledge of overall company policy and management philosophy.
- b. knowledge of procedures, rules and regulations.

<sup>1</sup> Conditions of Effective Leadership in the Industrial Organization, Douglas McGregor. Edited by G. L. Sackett, p. 40.

- c. Knowledge of requirements of the subordinate's own job: his duties, responsibilities and place in the organization.
- d. Knowledge of the personal peculiarities of the subordinate's immediate superior.
- e. Knowledge by the subordinate of the superior's opinion of his performance.
- f. Advance knowledge of changes that may affect the subordinate.

(3) The third requirement for the subordinate's security in his relationship of dependence on his superiors is that of consistent discipline. This may take the form of positive support for "right" actions as well as criticism and punishment for "wrong" ones. The subordinate, in order to be secure, requires consistent discipline in both cases.<sup>1</sup>

The preceding paragraphs have indicated what is desired in the petty officer, and some of the things the petty officer will need for himself. Is it possible to obtain a combination of these desires so that both parties will benefit? J. J. Evans, Jr., has listed five steps to be taken in providing essential supervisory training which may be helpful in arranging such a combination. They are:

- 1. Be assured every supervisor is cognizant of his responsibilities and authority.<sup>2</sup>
- 2. Have a clear understanding of working relationships with subordinates and those on the same level of supervision.
- 3. Develop measuring mediums.
- 4. Preparatory training and current training.
- 5. Planned contacts with the various members of the organization.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Conditions of Effective Leadership in the Industrial Organization, Douglas McGregor. Edited by E. C. Roslett, Human Factors in Management, pp. 40-46.

<sup>2</sup> For discussion of delegation of authority and responsibility, see The Science of Production Organization, W. A. Anderson and G. T. Schwenning, p. 216, and The Principles of Organization, J. E. Rooney and A. C. Reilly, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> A Program for Personnel Administration, J. J. Evans, Jr., p. 37



Mr. Evans considers the first three the foundation of the program for personnel administration.

If we are to be successful in combining the desires of the petty officer with what we desire of him, it will be necessary to profit by the mistakes made in the past and to try to correct the errors that we have discovered.

We have seen that the foundation of human relations within the Naval establishment has weaknesses. One of the weak spots we discovered was in the formal organization. That of itself does not mean that the entire formal organization is weak. The levels of personnel, the formal orders, instructions, compensations, systems, policies, rules, and regulations are all well defined and nicely prepared. However, our investigation has shown that there is a weakness in the presentation of these parts of the formal organization to the lower levels of supervision. We saw that the petty officers did not believe that they were accepted as a part of management, and we also saw that they had no common notion or opinion about the foundation for the rules and regulations under which they operate. It was also noted that on some questions there was not a common opinion which indicated the teaching of a common policy to the entire group. This, then, is one of the areas in which we must strengthen the foundation, which in turn should increase the feeling of security (belongingness and gratification) and adequacy for the petty officer.

First, it seems logical to show the petty officer where the rules may be found and give him a working acquaintance with them. This does not mean that he should be a walking law book, for many of the rules do not concern him. He should have only a foundation for the

rules that concern him and those who work for him, which includes any men he may direct. It is not necessary to memorize a lot of rules, but if he discusses them frequently and sees why and how they apply to him, they will soon become a living part of the petty officer and he will have no trouble enforcing them. "One writer has wisely pointed out that for specific purposes to be fully apprehended one must have a share in creating and accepting them as well as in devising ways and means of realizing them."<sup>1</sup> Why not give the petty officer at least a chance to accept the rules and devise ways of realizing them? Obviously, it is not suggested that a committee of petty officers be arranged to make the rules. This acceptance of the rules and understanding why they are in existence undoubtedly will increase the feeling of belongingness that is so necessary.

We have seen that it is necessary for the petty officer to know his authority and responsibility, yet we have seen that a few of the petty officers thought it would be desirable that they be in doubt on these subjects. Therefore, it seems desirable that next we improve his understanding of his responsibility and authority by giving him the backing and feeling of confidence he deserves. This, of course, is a factor that flows down from the top, and the training in these qualities must be done at the top.

It has been mentioned that the Navy has policies, and we have indicated that the petty officer should have a share in their realization. It is also just as important that all the petty officers have a common understanding of these policies so that they will have common opinions on questions that involve these policies. This will

<sup>1</sup> Human Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, p. 146.



help to provide a unity within the service, especially in the lower levels, that seems now to be less than is desired. Mr. Tead has written, "The true means of influencing others lie in the direction of fostering conditions in which people in and through their own inner desires come to seek the results which the leader also desires."<sup>1</sup> This can be accomplished by means of a "permanent underlying enthusiasm which does not have to be constantly fed with new excitement and inducements."<sup>2</sup> It is necessary to know:

That members of the organization: (1) know what its purposes are, (2) find these purposes congenial to themselves, and therefore, (3) find themselves willing and eager to espouse these purposes as their own and seek to realize them as a natural fulfillment of their own personal sense of self-realization and self-satisfaction."<sup>3</sup>

This leads us to the other foundations of human relations--the attitudes, sentiments and opinions of the individual. We have seen that there was some disagreement in these areas between the petty officers and the non-rated men. But what can we do about them? It may be desirable to change some of them or at least to teach the petty officer how to use those that he finds. When talking about attitudes, sentiments and opinions we are getting close to what some people call human nature, and there is a widespread feeling that human nature cannot be changed. Again, this is dependent upon the definition of human nature. If human nature means the underlying inborn traits present in the human nervous system, this apparently does not change; however, if human nature refers to the acquired characteristics as they are exhibited in conduct, then these can be changed.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Human Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, pp. 4 and 5.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 146.

It should be one of our purposes in teaching the petty officer to point out the various traits and help him develop ability to select those that can be changed speedily enough to be useful, and to recognize those that cannot be changed, or had best not be changed. Then we should show him how to make use of these traits or opinions and attitudes so that they will cause the least conflict in the organization.

This study has mentioned one other foundation of human relations, the informal organization. This concerns the small groups, the coffee mess, the friends who go ashore together, et cetera. The members of these groups obtain status within the group which of itself becomes very important to the individual. This fact should not be overlooked by the petty officer, and perhaps he can be shown how to use this situation to his own advantage and to the pleasure and satisfaction of the members of the informal group.

This discussion may seem to be much ado about a subject that has seemed rather unimportant and self-solving to many of us. Therefore, it is desirable to see how important others consider it before we look at possible solutions. Here are a few statements that have been made:

To the workmen under him, the foreman is frequently the sole effective interpreter of management. No matter how wise the plans and good the intentions of management, they are of little avail if they are not well understood and wisely applied by the foremen. Employers have become increasingly aware of the fact that an untrained foreman, uninformed as to his company's attitude in dealing with labor, is likely to fit poorly into the tense situation often found in recent years.<sup>1</sup>

Experience shows that the capacity to handle people is primary among a supervisor's qualifications. As a sub-leader, he will need to collaborate with others who exercise various functions and operate on various levels. In direct line relationships he will need an objective attitude toward the

<sup>1</sup> Employee Training, Committee on Education, The Chicago Association of Commerce, p. 21.





whole process of taking and giving orders as well as toward collaborating with other supervisors on his own level. Moreover, special skill will be required if he is to avail himself to the full of all that various staff experts have to give.<sup>1</sup>

Considered from the standpoint of its stability and prospects for permanent earning capacity, an American business corporation is today as strong as its human organization and no stronger. It is not sufficient that the organization shall consist from top to bottom of employees who are merely capable. The nature of their individual abilities must be studied and analyzed so that each employee may be used on the kind of work which he can do best. Channels of advancement must be kept open. Promotions must be made upon the basis of demonstrated merit. Opportunities for such training as will develop each individual to the limit of his capacity must be open upon equal terms to all. Finally, the component parts of the organization must be welded together into a smoothly working, harmonious unit.

These results will not work themselves out spontaneously. They require the same serious attention and intelligent planning on the part of management as is given to any other type of business problem. Indeed, they offer the most complex of all problems, for human nature is a variable which will not "stay put," as will material and things. It is subject to moods and caprices. Methods that are successful in one business cannot be transplanted without modification to another, nor can situations in the same business be met in exactly the same way tomorrow that proved satisfactory today. All this means that fundamental principles are involved, rather than special technique, and that the personnel and labor problems of industry require unremitting attention on the part of men who understand human psychology and are free from the handicap of closed minds or pet theories.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . Problems involved in the effective management of human relations in industry cannot be solved without some knowledge of what is going on in the worker's mind.

Nothing can be more fatal to the best-conceived plans of management for the skillful handling of industrial relations than to base a program upon the assumption that, as management thinks, so will the employee inevitably think if only he is in possession of the same facts. There is too much difference in their backgrounds of experience

<sup>1</sup> Personnel Administration, Paul Elgers and C. L. Myers, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> Personnel and Labor Problems in the Packing Industry, Arthur H. Carver, pp. 3 and 4.



and inherited viewpoints for this to be possible. Recognizing this fact, employers will realize that they themselves have something to learn and that amicable relations can be achieved only by approaching every issue with an open mind and in the spirit of compromise.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Henry Ford, II, has said:

One of our biggest and certainly one of our most difficult jobs for the future is to make all 130,000 Ford men and women effective team players, to a far greater degree than they have been in the past. There are many phases to this job but the heart of our problem can be stated very simply: it is to get each man in our organization to treat the men he works with as he would like to be treated himself.<sup>2</sup>

All of these remarks confirm the fact that the problem is an important one. Its importance is further indicated by the opinions expressed in various industries visited by the writer during the past year. All of the companies visited had some form of supervisors training program.

There are several types of training methods available for providing supervisor instruction. They have been conveniently summarized as shown on the following table, together with the method used in each type and the principal advantages and disadvantages:

<sup>1</sup> Personnel and Labor Problems in the Packing Industry, Arthur H. Carver, p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Ford II Speaks Out, Tom Lilley, in The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1947.

METHODS OF TRAINING SUPERVISORS<sup>1</sup>

Types of Training	Method Used	Possible Advantages	Possible Disadvantages
1. Staff Meeting	Information or instruction from a supervisor. Talks by experts.	Carries weight of authority. Saves time.	Misunderstanding. Little discussion. Little likelihood of opposition. No constructive thinking. Makes superior accountable if mistakes occur. Too many topics considered.
2. Lecture	Outside lecturers with or without discussion.	Furnish reliable information. Number in group unlimited.	Same as above. May be over heads of listeners. Outsider ignorant of local problems. Lack of continuity if not by same man.
3. Printed Matter	Reading of texts or references. Correspondence study.	Studying can be done as desired. Does not involve organizing a group. Information restricted to pertinent facts.	Requires great perseverance. Few persons absorb or complete it. Lacks stimulus of group contacts. Lacks interpretation of teacher.
4. Individual Coaching	Personal instruction by supervisor.	Conveys supervisor's own ideas. Chance to try out under supervisor. Less misunderstanding.	Takes infinite time--too slow. Restricted largely to training in new skills. Superior may be unable to teach effectively.
5. Informal	Group discussion of experience and opinions stimulated by leader.	Opportunity for expressing different points of view. Active participation develops logical thinking. Better understanding and absorption. Promotes cooperative effort. Sustains interest.	Leader may be incompetent to: Keep discussion moving. Prepare precise discussion outlines. Keep discussion on track. Conference may never get anywhere.  Leader or others may monopolize. Conference may play on words instead of facts. Group restricted as to size and subject matter.
6. Determinate Discussion	Group discussion directed by leader into specific channels.	Same as 5, also: Leader has detailed outline to guide. Covers more ground. Less side tracking. Absorption more thorough.	Same as under 5, but chances minimized.

<sup>1</sup>How to Train Supervisors, R. C. Beckman, p. 12.



But what sort of a plan do we desire? Since it is our desire to be practical, we should try to select a plan that fills the following conditions as nearly as possible:

1. A plan that is effective.
2. A plan that is simple.
3. A plan that is inexpensive.
4. A plan that is easy to establish.
5. A plan that will provide a meeting that is important to its members.

It should be mentioned that regardless of what plan is selected, it will have no chance for success unless it is believed in and actively supported by the person in command, as well as by all officers of the command. It may not be possible for all officers to believe in a plan before it has been tried and proved, but they should support it and give it a chance until it has been demonstrated that the plan is not satisfactory.

Of the plans suggested above, the one that comes closest to filling our desired conditions is one which would be a combination of the Informal Conference and the Determinate Discussion, Numbers 5 and 6. This conference method of teaching is one that:

. . . . proves to be an agency well adapted to the group's and the leader's education, because: (a) it enables the group to share in advance the leader's ideas; (b) it enables the leader to get the benefit of the group's ideas; and (c) it enables new combinations of ideas to be evolved which constitute creative thinking in the best sense.<sup>1</sup>

This plan appears to permit giving the petty officer all of the items mentioned on pages 59, 60, 61 and 62 above.

There are certain objections that will be raised to the plan. We will consider a few of those after investigating the plan itself.

<sup>1</sup>Russell Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, pp. 188 and 189.

This proposed conference should have a name which will be meaningful and will indicate to the petty officers and the rest of the personnel that it is a serious part of the organization; in other words, give it status. A name such as "Petty Officers' Supervisory Conference" is suggested. Every effort should be made to establish a good reputation for the conference. It should be made desirable.

The Petty Officers' Supervisory Conference must have a conference leader. This person probably has the most important task of the entire plan. If he is not skillful and has made no preparation for the conferences, they will probably fail completely. One of the officers of the ship or station should be assigned this duty, and he should make diligent preparation. He should learn how to conduct a conference and prepare a schedule of topics on the art of getting along with people, for presentation to the group. There are many texts available which can be used as a guide in this preparation, such as "Human Nature and Management," by Ordway Tead. (See Appendix C for suggestions.)

It is proposed that all petty officers from all branches of the service attached to the ship or station participate in the Petty Officers' Supervisory Conference. This will provide a wide variety of opinions on various subjects and permit a wide dissemination of information and ideas. On stations and ships where the number of petty officers is small the size of the conference will be no problem, for it is considered that a small group can accomplish more than is possible in a large group. On large stations the total number of petty officers present can be larger. It will be necessary to select a group not to exceed twenty-five to participate in the discussion and to rotate those who participate in the actual discussion, so that over a period



of time all will have an equal opportunity to present their ideas. At the same time, they will all have a chance to hear the topics discussed.

The purpose for which the group is being organized should determine its size and the whole manner of its operation. At least three clearly different possible objectives at once appear. A group may be organized (a) to create enthusiasm, (b) to impart information, (c) to foster deliberation and reach decisions.<sup>1</sup>

When considering the shortcomings we have discussed, which were revealed by the questionnaires and interviews, it is apparent that we are interested in all three of these objectives. We wish to create a feeling of belongingness and security; we wish to impart information; and we want the petty officers to think out and determine better methods for inter-personal relationships.

The location for holding the conference will depend upon the local situation. It is desirable to have a blackboard available and chairs for the participants to sit on. Beyond that very little equipment is needed. This demonstrates the fact that this method is economical. The conference should be held once each week. Each conference should not exceed two hours in length and usually should not be shorter than one hour. It is most desirable to hold the meetings during working hours, which it must be admitted is a problem that again will be determined by local conditions. At least they should not be held during the hours in which liberty is granted, in order that the attendance may be as large as possible.

The conference itself should consist of at least three parts. First, in each meeting the conference leader should present one of the theoretical principles which is fundamental in working with others. Time should be provided to discuss this principle, to find examples

<sup>1</sup>Human Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, p. 189.

of its appearance in the experiences of the members, and to show how it can be used most successfully. An example of this is the statement made so often in the interviews by both the petty officers and the non-rated men, "If they would treat us like they would want to be treated if they were in our position." From the investigation made in this study it was learned that there are many people in the Navy, both petty officers and non-rated men, who do not think they are getting this sort of treatment. Where can a better place or method be found to determine why a person feels this way, and to figure out a way to change this feeling for the better? There are innumerable explanations of human behavior that should be called to the attention of the petty officers and discussed BY THEM. This part of the training should consider the things that make people act as they do--the attitudes, sentiments and opinions--and an understanding of the informal organization. One of these presented at each meeting, with its discussion by the members of the conference, should be sufficient.

Second, the rules and regulations THAT CONCERN THE PETTY OFFICER and the men that work for them should be discussed. Again, consider only one rule at each meeting and completely cover it--its origin and necessity, where it can be found, how it can be applied, and better ways to use and enforce it. Most of this discussion should be by the men themselves after they have been informed of the rule and its origin. Probably one of the best ways to be sure to hit the problems that are most pressing is to consider in these conferences every problem that is taken to Captain's Mast; that is, not every case but the different types of problems. It is believed that such a discussion will be a means of reducing the number of problems that are brought



to Mast, because when the petty officers have figured out the way to avoid the problem, it has become a part of them and they will make more of an effort to see to it that their own ideas work out. It will also augment the discussion of the various rules that are in effect.

Third, each meeting should consider one of the problems that the petty officers have encountered in their dealings with others about the ship or station. It may be difficult to start a discussion on this sort of problem. However, with effort it can be done, and after the start has been made the ice is broken, and it is ventured that the number of problems presented will be surprising. These problems should be discussed by all the members for cause and solution, to get the exchange of ideas.

It is interesting to note that in most of the problems in interpersonal relationships no hard and fast rules can be dictated. Usually it is a case of common sense, and the men will assist each other in finding the satisfactory solution and in getting rid of prejudices and poor practices which otherwise would probably be continued in use.

It can be seen that such a plan of training will develop the feeling of belongingness in the petty officer--will help make him a part of management. He will have a better understanding of the rules that apply to him, and as such he should be more effective in applying them, for he will be determining means of enforcing them and know why he is doing so. His feeling of security should be bolstered, and a common understanding of the policies of the organization should develop, at least in each command. In addition, this system will have a therapeutic value. The men are given a chance to talk about rules and

regulations in a place where least harm can be done. If they get it out of their systems in such a meeting, there is less likelihood that such dissatisfactions will be expressed to the non-rated man, and in this manner his dissatisfactions may not be accentuated by those of the petty officer. It must be admitted that people will talk things out of their systems, so it seems good practice to provide the place for them to talk.

One of the most desirable advantages of such a system is the fact that these conferences will provide a sounding board from which attitudes and opinions as well as suggestions can reach command. This is an excellent line of communication that can be provided. A skillful conference leader should be able to learn much about the petty officers' ideas, suggestions and problems which may be of vital interest to those in command. It is not intended to imply that the conference leader should be a spy or a tell-tale. That situation should never exist, but the worthwhile information that is available should be used in the proper manner.

It must be admitted that there are objections to all plans, and this one will have them, too. One of the most common will probably be that no station or ship has time to tie its petty officers up for two hours each week, and to tie up many hours of an officer's time in preparation for such a meeting. It is true that the ship's work must go on, and at the same time the rust keeps right on rusting even though we do conduct a conference. However, in the event we find that such a training program decreases the time lost as "brig-time," over-leave, time spent at Mast, and just plain loafing time, and that the men are more contented and do their work easier and faster, then it seems we



have made up for the two hours "lost" in the conferences many times over. Actually, we have saved time by the conferences.

Another objection will be: We do not have an officer qualified or available to take on the duties of a conference leader. If the ends justify the means, then an officer can be found for such a duty. The first training will be difficult and tiring, but after the ground work has been laid his duties should be less confining. This is a problem that will have to be solved locally.

A third objection that may be raised is that it is not desirable to mollycoddle and baby the petty officers. It is not intended to treat them in this manner, and it is not necessary for such treatment to be used in any form of training. It is not believed that letting the petty officers know what the facts are, how they are to be applied, and showing them the best way to do things, is babying them.

Situations can be cited in which some of these principles have been used successfully, and these lend strength to the belief that the proposed conferences will prove useful. One of these incidents was related by Commander J. W. Boundy, Supply Corps, U.S.N., who was at that time serving as Fleet Supply Officer. During the time that plans were being made for the famous "Crossroads" operation in the Pacific in 1946, the demobilization activities were rapidly depriving the ships of their crews. In fact, the situation became so critical that some of the ships were unable to get under way just for lack of manpower. This situation was encountered on some of the supporting ships that were necessary for the planned operation and it was impossible to obtain more men to man those ships. The Commander Service Force called a

conference of the Commanding Officers and the Executive Officers of these ships, and explained the situation to them. This conversation included the purpose of the operation and what was to be done. These ship officers were requested to call their crews to quarters, explain the proposed operation to the men, and ask if any would volunteer to remain in the service for another year so the mission could be successfully completed. Interestingly enough, when the purpose of the operation and its nature were explained to the men, over ninety per cent of the men extended their time of service so that the required ships sailed with full complements. This experience is offered as a demonstration of what explaining the purpose of activities can mean to men.

Another experience was related by the same officer, in which, during the tense days of 1938 when the Japanese were using their "get tough" policy in the Orient, many of the American personnel were getting involved in minor brushes with the Japanese while on liberty in Shanghai. With the situation becoming more tense the Commander In Chief, Asiatic Fleet, decided that such skirmishes had to be stopped, and therefore ordered that any ship's crews who participated in such activities would lose its liberty. This situation was carefully explained to the crews, and when they knew the circumstances and realized that they had the responsibility themselves, they saw to it that none of their shipmates violated the orders. As a result, none of the ships' crews were deprived of liberty.



## Summary and Conclusions

This discussion may be summed up in the following manner.

The conversations heard in various gatherings where the military services are discussed and the articles frequently published in the periodicals have called our attention to a problem that seems to exist in the armed forces of the United States, with reference to the personnel in those forces. This study has attempted to analyze the situation in the Navy, in an effort to definitely isolate the problem, determine its causes, and then, if possible, suggest a solution that will remedy the unsatisfactory condition.

Since the situations mentioned above point toward a problem in the relationships between the levels of supervision, it was decided to sample the opinions, attitudes and sentiments of the first, second, and third class petty officers, and compare these findings with the opinions, attitudes and sentiments of the non-rated personnel who work with these petty officers. If a difference in the attitudes of the two groups was discovered, it was believed that the problem would have been traced to one of human relations, since human relations is founded on (1) attitudes of the individual; (2) sentiments of the individual; (3) opinions of the individual; (4) formal organization of the institution; and (5) informal organization in the institution.

Two sets of questionnaires were prepared containing identical questions which were appropriately worded for the group of petty officers and for the non-rated men. The questions used sampled the attitudes, sentiments and opinions of the individuals, and the petty

officers were asked about their relationship to the management of the Navy. A preliminary study was made at the Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois, to test the questions and procedure, so that all possible errors could be eliminated before the final study was made at the Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois.

Both the preliminary study and the experimental study itself indicated that there was a difference between the two groups in their attitudes, opinions and sentiments, and the petty officers did not feel that they were accepted as a part of management. It was believed that since the problem at this level of supervision appeared to be one of human relations, the solution was to improve that part of the petty officers' training pertaining to human relations. It was noted that the attitudes of the individual were affected by the work situation to which he was attached, as well as to the outside circumstances working on him. Therefore, the solution seemed to require local attention.

After considering the facts discovered by the investigation that was made in this study, it is suggested that instructions be issued directing each command to select an officer to act as a training officer for the petty officers and to be the conference leader, and to arrange for proper instruction of the conference leader in the art of conducting the conference; then, after he is proficient in that duty the commands should arrange for the conference method of instruction of the petty officers. Each meeting should present one principle of getting along with people--which actually is the understanding of the individual differences that exist in people, one of the rules and regulations which govern the petty officer and his men, and one of the problems which



some member of the group has encountered. Each of these three items should be discussed by the group, its cause suggested, reasons for success or failure investigated and an effort made to find a solution.

It is believed that this form of instruction properly administered would develop a common constructive attitude among the petty officer group which would permeate from them to the men working for them; an understanding of the rules by which they operate would be developed; time would be saved due to the reduction in time spent by personnel at Mast and under punishment; the petty officers would be taught how to perform their management duties so as to increase their feeling of security and adequacy; and the groups would learn how to work together more harmoniously to the betterment of the service.

APPENDIX A

The Preliminary Study



### Questions to Ask Non-Rated Men

Please write what you think is the best answer to the following questions in the blank following each question. Answer each question as it applies to your present job. If it has no such application, think of some other job you have had in the Navy where it did apply or give your present opinion.

There is no standard "correct" answer to the questions, so you will not be graded in any way. It is planned to compare what different people in the Navy think about the same questions.

Please DO NOT sign your name to the paper. The following information will be helpful if you wish to give it: I have been in the Navy about \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Your answers will be handled confidentially and not shown to anyone in the Navy other than the person making this survey. They will be burned as soon as the answers have been counted. The results will not be sent to this station.

- 
1. When there is a tough job to be done do you think your petty officer considers how it may affect you before he tells you to do the job?      Yes, No, Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_
  2. When your petty officer gives you a new job to do, do you think he explains it to you as carefully as he should?      Yes, No, Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_
  3. Do you think your petty officer has a personal interest in your welfare?      Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
  4. Do you think your petty officer should be interested in what you do when you go on liberty if you keep out of trouble?      Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
  5. When you do a good piece of work and deserve some praise, do you think your petty officer considers the way you would like to be praised or told about it before praising you?      Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
  6. Do you think that being praised about a good job that you do will make you do a better job on work you do in the future?      Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
  7. When your petty officer bawls you out, does he always definitely let you know what he is bawling you out for?      Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_

8. After your petty officer has bawled you out for something, does he always show you the correct way so the error can be avoided in the future? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
9. Do you think your petty officer would rather criticize you than praise you to your face? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
10. When your petty officer bawls you out, does it seem to you as though he is just mad at you personally? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
11. When your petty officer bawls you out, does he just do it in general and for everything, or does he bawl you out about the one thing that has gone wrong?  
Everything, or the thing wrong. \_\_\_\_\_
12. Do you think your petty officer believes that if he gives you praise when you deserve it you will expect him to give you special consideration or advancement? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
13. Do your petty officers ever criticize or reprimand you in such a way that you are more interested and enthusiastic than you were before the reprimand, rather than resentful and antagonistic? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
14. Do you think a petty officer should mention something praiseworthy at the same time that he must criticize your work? Yes, No, Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_
15. When you do something wrong, should the petty officer insist that you admit your fault in order that you can improve your performance next time? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
16. Do your petty officers give you constructive criticism in the presence of other men when such criticism might possibly be embarrassing? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
17. If you have a personal problem that is bothering you, should you be encouraged to discuss this problem with someone? Yes, No \_\_\_\_\_
18. If you take a complaint that actually is trivial, but you thought it was important, to a petty officer, would you rather he (a) tell you frankly that your complaint is trivial, or (b) allow you to feel that your complaint is not trivial? (a) or (b) \_\_\_\_\_
19. If you should take some problem that you believe is important to your petty officer, but he thinks it unimportant and does not agree with you, should he suggest you talk direct to your division officer about the problem? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_



20. If you should take some problem direct to your division officer without first consulting your leading petty officer, should the petty officer reprimand you for your action even before he is notified by the division officer of your having gone direct to the division officer? Yes, No

21. Which has the worst effect on morale of a division: (1) To place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should NOT be placed on report, or (2) to NOT place the man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender SHOULD be placed on report?

The worst effect caused by (1) or (2) \_\_\_\_\_

22. If your division officer directs your petty officer to have you report to the division officer at some specified hour, should the petty officer tell you the reason for the order? Yes, No

23. Which type of petty officer is most likely to get the best results with his men?

1. A petty officer who is uniformly exacting as to discipline and proper methods of work.
2. A petty officer who is uniformly lenient.
3. A petty officer who is lenient at some times and exacting at other times. 1, 2, or 3

24. Are petty officers generally more likely to give too much or too little credit to their non-rated men for the success of their division? Give too much or too little

25. Do petty officers generally invite the non-rated men to express their opinions of the plans and methods of the division, as much as they should? Yes, No

26. Do you think that criticism of existing methods and conditions by a non-rated man is a reliable evidence of genuine dissatisfaction and disloyalty to the petty officer? Yes, No

27. Rank in the order of their practical value the five following methods for winning the complete cooperation of non-rated men of a division to which you have been assigned as a leading petty officer. Assign rank (1) to the best method, rank (2) to the next best method, and so on.

Rank

Recommend promotion by rating, or appointing to "good job." \_\_\_\_\_  
 Recommend improved physical working conditions, such as better lighting, more efficient equipment, more comfortable chairs, or the like. \_\_\_\_\_

Encourage them to suggest improvements in methods of work. \_\_\_\_\_

Take personal pains to be unusually pleasant to them. \_\_\_\_\_

Compliment them as much as possible on the work they do quite well. \_\_\_\_\_

### Questions to Ask Petty Officers

Please write what you think is the best answer to the following questions in the blank following each question. Answer each question as it applies to your present job. If it has no such application, then think of some other job you have had in the Navy where it did apply, or what you think is the best answer.

There is no standard "correct" answer to the questions, so you will not be graded in any way. It is planned to compare what different people in the Navy think about the same questions.

Please do not sign your name to the paper. The following information will be helpful if you wish to give it: I have been in the Navy about \_\_\_\_\_ months. I have been a petty officer about \_\_\_\_\_ months.

Your answers will be handled confidentially and not shown to anyone in the Navy other than the person making this survey. They will be burned as soon as the answers have been counted. The results will not be sent to this station.

- 
1. When you have a tough job to be done do you consider how it may affect the man you assign to do it before you tell him to do the job? Yes, No, or Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_
  2. When you give a man a new job to do, do you explain it to him carefully before he starts the job? Yes, No, or Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_
  3. Are you interested in the welfare of every one of your men? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
  4. As long as your men keep out of trouble when on liberty and get back on time and sober, is it worth your while to be interested in what they do when on liberty? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
  5. When a man has done a good piece of work and deserves praise, do you think how he would like to be told about his good work before telling him about it? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
  6. Do you think that if you praise a man for a good piece of work he will be more productive on jobs you assign him in the future? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
  7. When a man has done something wrong and must be told about it, do you always definitely tell him what he did that he is being hawled out for? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
  8. After you have hawled a man out for doing something wrong, do you always show him how to avoid the error in the future? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_



9. Would you rather criticize your men than to praise them to their faces? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
10. When your men do something wrong do you get made at them personally? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
11. When it is necessary to correct a man, do you get after him for everything in general or just the think that has gone wrong? Everything in general, or just the one \_\_\_\_\_
12. Do you think that if you praise a man for a good job he will then expect you to give him special consideration or help him get advancement? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
13. Do you ever give reprimands or criticisms in such a way as to leave the non-rated man more interested and enthusiastic than before, rather than resentful and antagonistic? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
14. When you criticize a non-rated man's work, do you think you should mention something praiseworthy at the same time? Yes, No, Sometimes, Frequently \_\_\_\_\_
15. When a non-rated man has done something wrong, should he be made to admit his fault in order to get him to improve? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
16. Do you ever give constructive criticism to a non-rated man in the presence of other men when such criticism might possibly be more or less embarrassing? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
17. Do you think non-rated men should be encouraged to discuss their personal problems with someone? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
18. If a non-rated man comes to you with a trivial complaint, is it best (a) to tell him frankly that his complaint is trivial, or (b) to allow him to feel that you do not consider his complaint trivial? (a) or (b) \_\_\_\_\_
19. If a non-rated man comes to you with something he thinks is important and you do not agree with him, should you invite the non-rated man to take it up with your division officer direct? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
20. If, without consulting you, one of your non-rated men goes directly to your division officer with a problem, should you jump the non-rated man about it before you are informed of the matter by the division officer? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
21. Which has the worst effect on morale of a division:  
 (1) To place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should NOT be placed on report, or (2) To NOT place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should be placed on report?  
 The worst effect is caused by (1) or (2) \_\_\_\_\_

22. If your division officer directs you to have one of your non-rated men report to him at a specified hour, should you tell the non-rated man the reason for the order?  
Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
23. Which type of petty officer is most likely to get the best results?  
 1. A petty officer who is uniformly exacting as to discipline and proper methods of work.  
 2. A petty officer who is uniformly lenient.  
 3. A petty officer who is lenient at some times and exacting at other times. 1, 2, or 3 \_\_\_\_\_
24. Are petty officers generally more likely to give too much or too little credit to their non-rated men for the success of their division? Give too much or too little \_\_\_\_\_
25. Do petty officers generally invite the non-rated men to express their opinions of the plans and methods of the division, as much as they should? Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
26. Do you think that criticism of existing methods and conditions by a non-rated man is a reliable evidence of genuine dissatisfaction and disloyalty to you?  
Yes or No \_\_\_\_\_
27. Rank in the order of their practical value the five following methods for winning the complete cooperation of non-rated men of a division to which you have been assigned as leading petty officer. Assign rank (1) to the best method, rank (2) to the next best method, and so on.
- Rank
- Recommend promotion by rating, or appointing to "good job." \_\_\_\_\_
- Recommend improved physical working conditions, such as better lighting, more efficient equipment, more comfortable chairs, or the like. \_\_\_\_\_
- Encourage them to suggest improvements in methods of work \_\_\_\_\_
- Take personal pains to be unusually pleasant to them. \_\_\_\_\_
- Compliment them as much as possible on the work they do quite well. \_\_\_\_\_



ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS ASKED IN THE PILOT STUDY

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
1	Yes	30	22
	No	4	47
	Sometimes	12	22
	Omitted	4	9
-----			
2	Yes	96	22
	No	0	32
	Sometimes	4	46
-----			
3	Yes	84	55
	No	8	31
	Sometimes	8	14
-----			
4	Yes	36	23
	No	60	73
	Sometimes	4	4
-----			
5	Yes	80	28
	No	8	46
	Sometimes	0	22
	Omitted	12	4
-----			
6	Yes	76	91
	No	8	9
	Sometimes	16	0
-----			
7	Yes	100	63
	No	0	28
	Sometimes	0	9
-----			
8	Yes	88	55
	No	8	18
	Sometimes	4	27
-----			
9	Yes	4	31
	No	38	31
	Sometimes	4	9
	Omitted	4	9
-----			

## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Pilot Study - 2

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
10	Yes	8	14
	No	80	68
	Sometimes	12	9
	Omitted	0	9
11	Everything	12	31
	Thing Wrong	88	55
	Omitted	0	14
12	Yes	28	27
	No	56	55
	Sometimes	16	18
13	Yes	76	46
	No	16	36
	Sometimes	0	9
	Omitted	8	9
14	Yes	24	27
	No	12	27
	Sometimes	64	42
	Omitted	0	4
15	Yes	58	65
	No	42	31
	Omitted	0	4
16	Yes	16	60
	No	80	31
	Sometimes	4	9
17	Yes	80	72
	No	12	14
	Sometimes	8	14
18	A	44	31
	B	52	60
	Omitted	4	9
19	Yes	64	73
	No	24	23
	Sometimes	8	0
	Omitted	4	4
20	Yes	28	55
	No	64	41
	Omitted	8	4
21	1	36	45
	2	60	45
	Omitted	4	10



APPENDIX B

The Experimental Study

### Questions to Ask Petty Officers

Please check what you think is the best answer for each of the following questions. Answer each question as it applies to your present job. If it has no such application, then think of some other job you have had in the Navy where it did apply, or what you think is the best answer.

There is no standard "correct" answer to the questions. It is planned to compare what different people in the Navy think about the same questions.

Please do not sign your name to the paper. The following information will be helpful if you wish to give it: I have been in the Navy about \_\_\_\_\_ months. I have been a petty officer about \_\_\_\_\_ months. My age is \_\_\_\_\_. My rate is \_\_\_\_\_. I am assigned to \_\_\_\_\_ Department.

Your answers will be handled confidentially and not shown to anyone in the Navy other than the person making this survey. They will be burned as soon as the answers have been counted.

- 
1. On the average, which one is more likely to develop self-confidence in a person?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Praise as it is usually given
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ Criticism as it is usually given
  2. Which of these two types of mistakes are petty officers more likely to make in dealing with non-rated men:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Give too much criticism
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ Give too much praise
  3. Criticism, in order to be as constructive as possible in its effects, should usually be directed toward which of the following:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ The personality of the man
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ The work or acts of the man
  4. Praise, in order to be as constructive as possible in its effects, should usually be directed toward which of the following:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ The personality of the man
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ The work or acts of the man
  5. In order to have the best effect, should criticism usually be specific or general?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Specific
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ General
  6. If non-rated men are given well-founded praise as freely as they are given well-founded criticism, to what extent, if any, is it likely to make them expect special consideration or advancement before they are entitled to it?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ It will very greatly increase their expectation of special consideration before they are entitled to it.
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ It will increase their expectation considerably.
    3. \_\_\_\_\_ Moderately
    4. \_\_\_\_\_ Slightly
    5. \_\_\_\_\_ It will not increase their expectation of special consideration before they are entitled to it.



7. To what extent is it possible for a petty officer to give reprimand or criticism in such a way as to leave the non-rated man more interested and enthusiastic than before, rather than resentful and antagonistic?
1. ☐ It is always possible.
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
8. Which type of man is more likely to be harmed by reprimand?
1. ☐ The more conscientious man
  2. ☐ The less conscientious man
9. When a petty officer is criticizing a man's work, to what extent, if any, should he try to mention something praiseworthy at the same time?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
10. When a man has done something wrong, to what extent is it necessary to make him admit his fault in order to get him to improve?
1. ☐ It is always necessary.
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
11. To what extent should a petty officer "make an example" of some non-rated man by being over-severe for the sake of the moral effect upon the other non-rated men?
1. ☐ Frequently
  2. ☐ Occasionally
  3. ☐ Rarely
  4. ☐ Never
12. At what time of the day is it usually best to give a serious criticism to a non-rated man?
1. ☐ At the beginning of the day
  2. ☐ Midday
  3. ☐ Close of the day
13. Is it advisable for petty officers to tease and joke with non-rated men working for them, during working hours?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ Rarely
  4. ☐ Never
14. To what extent would it be suitable for a petty officer to accept a loan from one of his non-rated men, to be repaid within a month or two?
1. ☐ Frequently
  2. ☐ Occasionally
  3. ☐ Rarely
  4. ☐ Never

15. When non-rated men are being instructed by their petty officers, which of the following things are the non-rated men most likely to do?
1. ☐ Ask too many questions
  2. ☐ Ask too few questions
16. Which of the following is the most frequent cause of non-rated men asking too many questions when being instructed by their petty officers?
1. ☐ They want to show their interest.
  2. ☐ They have not been paying close attention.
  3. ☐ They are unintelligent.
  4. ☐ The instructions have not been made clear.
17. Which one of the following is the most frequent cause of non-rated men asking too few questions when being instructed by their petty officers?
1. ☐ They do not realize their need for more complete instruction.
  2. ☐ They do not want to seem unintelligent.
  3. ☐ They do not want to bother their petty officer.
  4. ☐ They have not been paying attention.
18. Which of the following types of errors by a non-rated man is more likely to cause a petty officer to feel irritated?
1. ☐ An error due to a mistake in judgment
  2. ☐ An error due to a wrong motive (intention)
19. How often is it advisable to give a non-rated man credit openly for his suggestions that are adopted in his division?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
20. Which one of the following is the best reason for giving a non-rated man credit openly for his suggestions which are adopted?
1. ☐ To show that you are a fair-minded petty officer
  2. ☐ To reward the non-rated man
  3. ☐ To stimulate the initiative of the non-rated man
21. Which type of man is likely to have better morale on the job?
1. ☐ One who feels that he is still improving
  2. ☐ One who feels that he has practically reached the limits of improvement on his present job
22. When a petty officer is discussing contemplated plans with his non-rated men, which type of non-rated man is more likely to be helpful?
1. ☐ The type which points out the advantages of the plans
  2. ☐ The type which points out the disadvantages of the plans



23. To what extent is it a good thing for a petty officer to be in doubt regarding the character, scope and limits of his responsibility and authority?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ It is always a good thing for him to be in doubt.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
24. Which non-rated men are more likely to give good results?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Non-rated men with average ability under the supervision of a petty officer with better than average leadership ability
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Non-rated men with better than average ability under the supervision of a petty officer with average leadership ability
25. On the whole, are non-rated men more likely to develop too much or too little self-confidence?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Too much
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Too little
26. Which of these two qualities is more likely to be hindered by a feeling of fear?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Dependability
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Initiative
27. To what extent is it a good thing to deliberately allow a non-rated man to make a mistake as a means of training the non-rated man?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
28. Which of these two combinations is usually to be preferred in a petty officer?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Unusual initiative and average cooperation
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Unusual cooperation and average initiative
29. Which of the three following types of petty officers is most likely to get the best results?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is uniformly exacting as to discipline and proper methods of work
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is uniformly lenient
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is lenient at some times and exacting at other times
30. Are petty officers generally more likely to give too much or too little credit to their non-rated men for the success of their division?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Too much
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Too little

31. Are petty officers generally more likely to place too much or too little of the blame on their non-rated men for unfavorable results in their division?
1. ☐ Too much
  2. ☐ Too little
32. To what extent do you think that criticism of existing methods and conditions by a non-rated man is a reliable evidence of genuine dissatisfaction and disloyalty to the petty officer?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
33. In the absence of his immediate superior, what should a petty officer do about making decisions of the type which his superior is accustomed to make?
1. ☐ Refer such matters to a still higher authority
  2. ☐ Make the decision himself
  3. ☐ Try to avoid a decision until his immediate superior returns, even though the work will probably suffer a little
34. If there is friction between two non-rated men in the division which might lower the morale or the standards of work, should the petty officer try to iron out their difficulties?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
35. If a petty officer helps non-rated men in their work during rush periods, which is more likely to be the effect upon their respect and regard for his importance?
1. ☐ To lessen their respect and regard
  2. ☐ To deepen their respect and regard
36. If a petty officer disagrees with some definitely settled policy of the division, to what extent should he feel free to divulge his opinion to his non-rated men?
1. ☐ Not at all
  2. ☐ Only to non-rated men with good judgment
  3. ☐ As he wishes, as long as he makes clear that it is his personal opinion
37. To what extent is it advisable for a petty officer to make DIRECT criticisms of his predecessor to his non-rated men, assuming that criticisms are justified?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never



38. Should non-rated men be encouraged to discuss their personal problems with someone?
1. ☐ They should be encouraged.
  2. ☐ They should NOT be encouraged.
39. If a non-rated man has to put up with some irritation or handicap in his working conditions, about which nothing can be done at the present, which is usually the better thing for the petty officer to do when the non-rated man brings up this problem for discussion with him?
1. ☐ Admit the importance of the problem and explain that nothing can be done at present
  2. ☐ Try to prove that the problem is not important to the non-rated man
40. If a non-rated man goes to a petty officer with a trivial complaint, which of these two procedures is usually the better?
1. ☐ Tell him frankly that his complaint is trivial
  2. ☐ Allow him to feel that the petty officer does not consider his complaint trivial
41. If a non-rated man goes to a petty officer with something he thinks is important and the petty officer does not agree with him, should the petty officer invite the non-rated man to take it up with his division officer direct?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
42. If, without consulting the petty officer, one of his non-rated men goes directly to his division officer with a problem, what action should the petty officer take?
1. ☐ Take it up at once with the non-rated man
  2. ☐ Take it up at once with the officer
  3. ☐ Wait until the matter is brought "officially" to his attention either by the non-rated man or by the officer
43. Which has the worst effect on morale of a division?
1. ☐ To place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should NOT be placed on report
  2. ☐ To NOT place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should be placed on report
44. If a division officer directs a petty officer to have one of his non-rated men report to him at a specified hour, should the petty officer tell the non-rated man the reason for the order?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never

45. What type of competition is usually more stimulating to a man?
1. ☐ Try to beat his own previous record
  2. ☐ Try to beat the record of a fellow worker
  3. ☐ Try to beat a quota standard set by the petty officer
46. When there is a tough job to be done, should the petty officer consider how it may affect the non-rated man before he tells him to do the job?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
47. When you give a man a new job, do you explain it to him carefully before he starts the job?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
48. Are you interested in the welfare of every one of your men?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
49. As long as your men keep out of trouble when on liberty and get back on time and sober, is it worth your while to be interested in what they do when on liberty?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
50. When a man has done a good piece of work and deserves praise, do you think how he would like to be told about his good work before telling him about it?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes
51. Do you think that if you praise a man for a good piece of work he will be more productive on jobs you assign him in the future?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
52. When a man has done something wrong and must be told about it, do you always definitely tell him what he did that he is being bawled out for?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes



53. After you have bawled a man out for doing something wrong, do you show him how to avoid the error in the future?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes
54. Would you rather criticize your men than to praise them to their faces?
1. ☐ Rather criticize
  2. ☐ Rather praise
55. To what extent do you actually give reprimands or criticisms in such a way as to leave the non-rated man more interested and enthusiastic than before, rather than resentful and antagonistic?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
56. To what extent do you give constructive criticisms to a non-rated man in the presence of his shipmates, when such criticism might possibly be more or less embarrassing?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
57. To what extent do you greet in the morning all of your non-rated men within normal distance or convenience?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
58. If you are OBVIOUSLY checking up on a non-rated man's work, what usually do you make your reason SEEM to be?
1. ☐ That you are checking up to see whether the non-rated man has the proper knowledge and skill
  2. ☐ That you are checking up to see whether the non-rated man is working conscientiously
59. In correcting a non-rated man for a mistake, do you assume, when proof is lacking, that the non-rated man made the mistake deliberately or because his judgment was poor?
1. ☐ That it was deliberate
  2. ☐ That the non-rated man used poor judgment
60. When laying down rules, how often do you give reasons for these rules?
1. ☐ Much oftener than is necessary
  2. ☐ A little oftener than is necessary
  3. ☐ Just about as often as I should
  4. ☐ A little less than I should
  5. ☐ Much less than I should

51. If a non-rated man wants to try out a new method which you feel pretty sure will not work out so well, do you ever let him try it out anyway?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ I let him try it.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ I do not let him try it.
62. To what extent do you invite your non-rated men to express their opinions of the plans and methods of the division?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Much more than I should
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ A little more than I should
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About as much as I should
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ A little less than I should
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Much less than I should
63. How often do you deliberately allow a non-rated man to make a mistake as a means of training him?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
64. To what extent do you believe the petty officers are a part of the management group of the Navy?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ They are all definitely a part of management.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Only chief petty officers are a part of management.
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Only a few of the petty officers are a part of management.
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ None of the petty officers are a part of management.
65. To what extent do you think an effort is made by the officers to make the petty officers feel they are a part of the management of the Navy?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ An honest effort is made to make them feel they are a part of management.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ There is some effort made.
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Very little effort is made.
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ No effort is made.
66. To what extent is the necessity for rules and orders explained to you at the time they are issued to you for transmittal to your non-rated men and for compliance?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Their necessity is always explained.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Sometimes
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Seldom
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
67. To what extent are the rules and orders themselves explained to you at the time they are issued to you for transmittal to your non-rated men and for compliance?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ They are always explained.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Sometimes
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Seldom
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never



It is recognized that much of the material published by the Navy does not reach all personnel nor is of interest to them; however, please list below the Naval publications, books, orders, letters, etc., that you consider contain the rules and regulations that govern you on your job. Also, fill in the form complete.

-----		
	:	:
Names of the publications,	: About when did you:	About when did you last
books, letters, orders, etc.:	last read or study:	discuss appropriate pub-
	: it.	: lications with those who
	:	: work for you and which
	:	: concern them.
-----		

### Questions to Ask Non-Rated Men

Please check what you think is the best answer for each of the following questions. Answer each question as it applies to your present job. If it has no such application, think of some other job you have had in the Navy where it did apply or give your present opinion.

There is no standard "correct" answer to the questions. It is planned to compare what different people in the Navy think about the same questions.

Please DO NOT sign your name to the paper. The following information will be helpful if you wish to give it: I have been in the Navy about \_\_\_\_\_ months. My age is \_\_\_\_\_. My rate is \_\_\_\_\_. I am assigned to \_\_\_\_\_ Department.

Your answers will be handled confidentially and not shown to anyone in the Navy other than the person making this survey. They will be burned as soon as the answers have been counted.

- 
1. On the average, which one is more likely to develop self-confidence in a person?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Praise as it is usually given
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ Criticism as it is usually given
  2. Which of these two types of mistakes are petty officers more likely to make in dealing with non-rated men:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Give too much criticism
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ Give too much praise
  3. Criticism, in order to be as constructive as possible in its effects, should usually be directed toward which of the following:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ The personality of the man
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ The work or acts of the man
  4. Praise, in order to be as constructive as possible in its effects, should usually be directed toward which of the following:
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ The personality of the man
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ The work or acts of the man
  5. In order to have the best effect, should criticism usually be specific or general?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ Specific
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ General
  6. If non-rated men are given well-founded praise as freely as they are given well-founded criticism, to what extent, if any, is it likely to make them expect special consideration or advancement before they are entitled to it?
    1. \_\_\_\_\_ It will very greatly increase their expectation of special consideration before they are entitled to it.
    2. \_\_\_\_\_ It will increase their expectation considerably.
    3. \_\_\_\_\_ Moderately
    4. \_\_\_\_\_ Slightly
    5. \_\_\_\_\_ It will not increase their expectation of special consideration before they are entitled to it.



7. To what extent is it possible for a petty officer to give reprimand or criticism in such a way as to leave the non-rated man more interested and enthusiastic than before, rather than resentful and antagonistic?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ It is always possible.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
8. Which type of man is more likely to be harmed by reprimand?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ The more conscientious man
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ The less conscientious man
9. When a petty officer is criticizing a man's work, to what extent, if any, should he try to mention something praiseworthy at the same time?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Always
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
10. When a man has done something wrong, to what extent is it necessary to make him admit his fault in order to get him to improve?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ It is always necessary.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
11. To what extent should a petty officer "make an example" of some non-rated man by being over-severe for the sake of the moral effect upon the other non-rated men?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
12. At what time of the day is it usually best to give a ~~SEVERE~~ criticism to a non-rated man?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ At the beginning of the day
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Midday
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Close of the day
13. Is it advisable for petty officers to tease and joke with non-rated men working for them, during working hours?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Always
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never

14. To what extent would it be suitable for a petty officer to accept a loan from one of his non-rated men, to be repaid within a month or two?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
15. When non-rated men are being instructed by their petty officers, which of the following things are the non-rated men most likely to do?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Ask too many questions
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Ask too few questions
16. Which of the following is the most frequent cause of non-rated men asking too many questions when being instructed by their petty officers?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ They want to show their interest.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ They have not been paying close attention.
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ They are unintelligent.
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ The instructions have not been made clear.
17. Which one of the following is the most frequent cause of non-rated men asking too few questions when being instructed by their petty officers?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ They do not realize their need for more complete instruction.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ They do not want to seem unintelligent.
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ They do not want to bother their petty officer.
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ They have not been paying attention.
18. Which of the following types of errors by a non-rated man is more likely to cause a petty officer to feel irritated?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ An error due to a mistake in judgment
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ An error due to a wrong motive (intention)
19. How often is it advisable to give a non-rated man credit openly for his suggestions that are adopted in his division?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Always
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
20. Which one of the following is the best reason for giving a non-rated man credit openly for his suggestions which are adopted?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ To show that you are a fair-minded petty officer
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ To reward the non-rated man
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ To stimulate the initiative of the non-rated man
21. Which type of man is likely to have better morale on the job?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ One who feels that he is still improving
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ One who feels that he has practically reached the limits of improvement on his present job



22. When a petty officer is discussing contemplated plans with his non-rated men, which type of non-rated man is more likely to be helpful?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ The type which points out the advantages of the plans
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ The type which points out the disadvantages of the plans
23. To what extent is it a good thing for a petty officer to be in doubt regarding the character, scope and limits of his responsibility and authority?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ It is always a good thing for him to be in doubt.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
24. Which non-rated men are more likely to give good results?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Non-rated men with average ability under the supervision of a petty officer with better than average leadership ability
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Non-rated men with better than average ability under the supervision of a petty officer with average leadership ability
25. On the whole, are non-rated men more likely to develop too much or too little self-confidence?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Too much
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Too little
26. Which of these two qualities is more likely to be hindered by a feeling of fear?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Dependability
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Initiative
27. To what extent is it a good thing to deliberately allow a non-rated man to make a mistake as a means of training the non-rated men?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
28. Which of these two combinations is usually to be preferred in a petty officer?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Unusual initiative and average cooperation
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Unusual cooperation and average initiative
29. Which of the three following types of petty officers is most likely to get the best results?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is uniformly exacting as to discipline and proper methods of work
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is uniformly lenient
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ One who is lenient at some times and exacting at other times

30. Are petty officers generally more likely to give too much or too little credit to their non-rated men for the success of their division?
1. ☐ Too much
  2. ☐ Too little
31. Are petty officers generally more likely to place too much or too little of the blame on their non-rated men for unfavorable results in their division?
1. ☐ Too much
  2. ☐ Too little
32. To what extent do you think that criticism of existing methods and conditions by a non-rated man is a reliable evidence of genuine dissatisfaction and disloyalty to the petty officer?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
33. In the absence of his immediate superior, what should a petty officer do about making decisions of the type which his superior is accustomed to make?
1. ☐ Refer such matters to a still higher authority
  2. ☐ Make the decision himself
  3. ☐ Try to avoid a decision until his immediate superior returns, even though the work will probably suffer a little
34. If there is friction between two non-rated men in the division which might lower the morale or the standards of work, should the petty officer try to iron out their difficulties?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
35. If a petty officer helps non-rated men in their work during rush periods, which is more likely to be the effect upon their respect and regard for his importance?
1. ☐ To lessen their respect and regard
  2. ☐ To deepen their respect and regard
36. If a petty officer disagrees with some definitely settled policy of the division, to what extent should he feel free to divulge his opinion to his non-rated men?
1. ☐ Not at all
  2. ☐ Only to non-rated men with good judgment
  3. ☐ As he wishes, as long as he makes clear that it is HIS personal opinion



37. To what extent is it advisable for a petty officer to make DIRECT criticisms of his predecessor to his non-rated men, assuming that criticisms are justified?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Always
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Usually
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About half the time
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Never
38. Should non-rated men be encouraged to discuss their personal problems with someone?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ They should be encouraged.
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ They should NOT be encouraged.
39. If a non-rated man has to put up with some irritation or handicap in his working conditions, about which nothing can be done at the present, which is usually the better thing for the petty officer to do when the non-rated man brings up this problem for discussion with him?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Admit the importance of the problem and explain that nothing can be done at present
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Try to prove that the problem is not important to the non-rated man
40. If a non-rated man goes to a petty officer with a trivial complaint, which of these two procedures is usually the better?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Tell him frankly that his complaint is trivial
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Allow him to feel that the petty officer does not consider his complaint trivial
41. If a non-rated man goes to a petty officer with something he thinks is important and the petty officer does not agree with him, should the petty officer invite the non-rated man to take it up with his division officer direct?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Yes
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ No
42. If, without consulting the petty officer, one of his non-rated men goes directly to his division officer with a problem, what action should the petty officer take?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Take it up at once with the non-rated man
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Take it up at once with the officer
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Wait until the matter is brought "officially" to his attention either by the non-rated man or by the officer
43. Which has the worst effect on morale of a division?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ To place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should NOT be placed on report
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ To NOT place a man on report when the other men in the division think that the offender should be placed on report

44. If a division officer directs a petty officer to have one of his non-rated men report to him at a specified hour, should the petty officer tell the non-rated man the reason for the order?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
45. Which type of competition is usually more stimulating to a man?
1. ☐ Try to beat his own previous record
  2. ☐ Try to beat the record of a fellow worker
  3. ☐ Try to beat a quota standard set by the petty officer
46. When there is a tough job to be done, should the petty officer consider how it may affect the non-rated man before he tells him to do the job?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
47. When your petty officer gives you a new job, does he explain it to you carefully before you start the job?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
48. Is your petty officer interested in the welfare of every one of his men?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
49. Do you think your petty officer should be interested in what you do when you go on liberty if you keep out of trouble?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
50. When you have done a good piece of work and deserve praise, do you think your petty officer considers the way you would like to be praised or told about it before praising you?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes



51. Do you think that being praised about a good job that you do will make you do a better job on work you do in the future?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
52. When your petty officer bawls you out, does he always definitely let you know what he is bawling you out for?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes
53. After your petty officer has bawled you out for something, does he show you how to avoid the error in the future?
1. ☐ Yes
  2. ☐ No
  3. ☐ Sometimes
54. Do you think your petty officer would rather criticize you than praise you?
1. ☐ Rather criticize
  2. ☐ Rather praise
55. To what extent does your petty officer give reprimands or criticisms in such a way as to leave you more interested and enthusiastic than before, rather than resentful and antagonistic?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
56. To what extent do your petty officers give you constructive criticism in the presence of your shipmates, when such criticism might possibly be more or less embarrassing?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
57. To what extent do your petty officers greet you in the morning when you are within normal distance or convenience?
1. ☐ Always
  2. ☐ Usually
  3. ☐ About half the time
  4. ☐ Rarely
  5. ☐ Never
58. When your petty officer is OBVIOUSLY checking up on the work you are doing, what does his reason SEEM to be?
1. ☐ Checking up to see whether you have the proper knowledge and skill
  2. ☐ Checking up to see whether you are working conscientiously

59. When your petty officers correct you for a mistake, does it usually seem that they assume you made the mistake deliberately or that it was poor judgment on your part?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ That it was deliberate
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ That you used poor judgment
60. When your petty officers lay down rules, how often do they give reasons for these rules?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Much oftener than is necessary
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ A little oftener than is necessary
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Just about as often as they should
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ A little less than they should
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Much less than they should
61. If you suggest trying out a new method which your petty officer feels sure will not work out so well, does he ever let you try it out anyway?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ He lets you try it out
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ He does not let you try it out
62. To what extent do your petty officers invite you to express your opinions of the plans and methods of the division?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Much more than they should
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ A little more than they should
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ About as much as they should
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ A little less than they should
  5. \_\_\_\_\_ Much less than they should
63. How often do your petty officers deliberately allow you to make a mistake as a means of training you?
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Frequently
  2. \_\_\_\_\_ Occasionally
  3. \_\_\_\_\_ Rarely
  4. \_\_\_\_\_ Never



ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS ASKED IN THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer No.</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
1	1	95	88
	2	5	12
-----			
2	1	65	79
	2	35	21
-----			
3	1	20	12
	2	80	88
-----			
4	1	10	28
	2	90	72
-----			
5	1	33	63
	2	17	37
-----			
6	1	20	17
	2	25	29
	3	16	17
	4	10	0
	5	29	37
-----			
7	1	37	27
	2	28	45
	3	21	27
	4	14	0
	5	0	0
-----			
8	1	83	80
	2	17	20
-----			
9	1	50	43
	2	24	25
	3	10	4
	4	10	8
	5	6	20
-----			
10	1	35	42
	2	29	8
	3	10	8
	4	19	0
	5	7	42
-----			

## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 2

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer No.</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
11	1	5	0
	2	32	29
	3	28	16
	4	35	55
-----			
12	1	36	29
	2	22	12
	3	42	59
-----			
13	1	3	4
	2	17	39
	3	23	22
	4	57	35
-----			
14	1	0	0
	2	7	38
	3	22	16
	4	71	46
-----			
15	1	8	13
	2	92	87
-----			
16	1	22	33
	2	27	29
	3	0	0
	4	51	38
-----			
17	1	58	50
	2	22	21
	3	10	4
	4	10	25
-----			
18	1	33	4
	2	67	96
-----			
19	1	76	40
	2	17	27
	3	0	13
	4	5	20
	5	2	0
-----			



## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 3

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
20	1	13	25
	2	9	0
	3	78	75
-----			
21	1	93	100
	2	7	0
-----			
22	1	41	50
	2	59	50
-----			
23	1	24	12
	2	10	0
	3	3	0
	4	20	16
	5	43	72
-----			
24	1	73	66
	2	27	34
-----			
25	1	48	33
	2	52	67
-----			
26	1	46	53
	2	54	42
-----			
27	1	2	12
	2	53	42
	3	17	12
	4	28	34
-----			
28	1	42	33
	2	58	67
-----			
29	1	65	42
	2	7	12
	3	28	46
-----			
30	1	7	12
	2	93	88
-----			
31	1	80	93
	2	20	7
-----			

## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 4

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
32	1	12	12
	2	29	29
	3	34	12
	4	14	17
	5	11	30
-----			
33	1	34	48
	2	50	47
	3	16	5
-----			
34	1	31	60
	2	13	20
	3	2	6
	4	4	14
	5	0	0
-----			
35	1	7	0
	2	93	100
-----			
36	1	40	12
	2	5	4
	3	55	84
-----			
37	1	10	16
	2	10	8
	3	4	12
	4	32	26
	5	44	38
-----			
38	1	88	75
	2	12	25
-----			
39	1	31	64
	2	19	36
-----			
40	1	60	52
	2	40	48
-----			
41	1	64	83
	2	36	17
-----			
42	1	48	39
	2	12	8
	3	40	53
-----			



## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 5

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
43	1	63	56
	2	37	44
-----			
44	1	25	26
	2	12	21
	3	2	4
	4	12	4
	5	49	45
-----			
45	1	34	39
	2	24	22
	3	42	39
-----			
46	1	72	50
	2	24	29
	3	0	0
	4	0	14
	5	4	7
-----			
47	1	90	27
	2	5	30
	3	5	8
	4	0	8
	5	0	27
-----			
48	1	95	57
	2	5	43
-----			
49	1	24	13
	2	17	13
	3	10	0
	4	6	4
	5	43	70
-----			
50	1	67	22
	2	9	0
	3	24	78
-----			
51	1	98	96
	2	2	4
-----			
52	1	96	61
	2	0	35
	3	4	4
-----			

## Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 6

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
53	1	96	52
	2	0	26
	3	4	22
-----			
54	1	18	61
	2	82	39
-----			
55	1	39	26
	2	46	13
	3	10	17
	4	5	17
	5	0	27
-----			
56	1	13	0
	2	4	14
	3	2	14
	4	42	72
	5	39	0
-----			
57	1	63	14
	2	35	72
	3	2	7
	4	0	7
	5	0	0
-----			
58	1	67	64
	2	33	36
-----			
59	1	6	14
	2	94	86
-----			
60	1	5	6
	2	17	20
	3	67	53
	4	9	21
	5	2	0
-----			
61	1	72	53
	2	28	47
-----			
62	1	5	0
	2	17	0
	3	62	43
	4	5	50
	5	11	7
-----			



Analysis of Questions Asked in the Experimental Study - 7

<u>Question</u>	<u>Answer Number</u>	<u>Per Cent of Rated Total</u>	<u>Per Cent of Non-Rated Total</u>
63	1	7	7
	2	41	29
	3	33	35
	4	19	29
-----			
64	1	85	
	2	3	Not
	3	5	
	4	7	Asked
-----			
65	1	31	
	2	22	Not
	3	37	
	4	10	Asked
-----			
66	1	45	
	2	36	Not
	3	12	
	4	7	Asked
-----			
67	1	36	
	2	40	Not
	3	19	
	4	5	Asked
-----			

Publications Listed by Petty Officers  
as Containing Basic Rules of the Navy,  
Grouped by Rate of the Petty Officers.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Number Mentioned</u>
<u>Hospitalman</u>	3 listed publications.
All Hands Magazine	2
Our Navy	1
Circular Letters of BuMed	2
Course Books	1
Plan of the Day	1
Medical Manuals and books	2
Blue Jacket's Manual	1
Bulletin Board Notices	1
Navy Regulations	1
BuPers Manuals	1
Correspondence Manuals	1
Uniform Regulations	1
<u>Storekeepers</u>	3 listed publications.
Bu S&A Manual	3
Alnevs	2
All Hands Magazine	1
S.E.A. Editors Manual	1
Navy Regulations	2
Pub. Informer	1
9th N.D. Newsletter	1
BuPers Manual	2
Travel Instructions	1
Monthly Bulletins	1
Circular Letters	1
Standard Stock Catalogue	1
<u>Ship's Servicemen</u>	1 listed publication.
All Hands	1
Daily Work Sheet	1
<u>Damage Controlmen</u>	1 listed publication.
Articles for Government of Navy	1
Station Plan of the Day	1 (week ago)
<u>Personnelmen</u>	1 listed publication.
Blue Jackets Manual	1
Times	1
Our Navy	1



<u>Name</u>	<u>Number Mentioned</u>
<u>Telemen</u>	1 listed publication
Navy Regulations	1
Uniform Regulations	1
Communication Instructions	1
Various JATAP	1
<u>DT</u>	2 listed publications.
All Hands	1
Training Bulletin & Manual	2
<u>Bontswain's Mates</u>	3 listed publications.
Apprentice Seaman's Manual	1
Blue Jacket's Manual	1
Course Books	2
Manuals	1
A to N	1
Articles for Government of the Navy	1
All Hands	1
Circular Letters	1
Stevedoring & Rigger	1
Knight's Seamanship	1
<u>Quartermasters</u>	1 listed publication.
Blue Jacket's Manual	1
All Hands Magazine	1
Naval Training Bulletin	1
Our Navy Magazine	1
<u>Commissarymen</u>	7 listed publications.
All Hands Magazine	4
Our Navy Magazine	2
AlHavs	2
NavActs	1
Circular Letters	2
Memos of Superior Officers	1
Commissary Bulletins	1
<u>Metalsmiths</u>	1 listed publication.
Artificers Book	1
P.S.O. Book	1
Requirements for Petty Officers	1
<u>Engineers</u>	1 listed publication.
Semi-annual Bulletins	1

<u>Name</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Mentioned</u>
<u>Yemen</u>	3 listed publications.
BuPers Manual	3
Navy Department Bulletins	1
BuPers Circular Letters	2
Uniform Regulations	2
General Orders	2
AlNavs	2
Navy Travel Instructions	1
Correspondence Manual	1
All Hands Magazine	1
Navy Regulations	2
Manual of Qualifications for Advancement	
In Rating	1
Courts & Broads	1
Filing Manual	1
Instructions for Recruiting Service	1
Training Courses	1
Navy Digest	1
Court Martial Orders	1



APPENDIX C

The Conference and Conference Leader

## The Conference and Conference Leader

A few suggestions for the conduct of the conference and for the assistance of the conference leader may prove helpful.

The most effective training for present supervisors is that in which the judgment of men who are experiencing problems on the job is pooled and developed. For this purpose, actual case material is needed. After a class is well launched, it is usually not difficult to get the men to bring up actual cases for discussion. But, at the outset of a course, a preliminary step is to find some other method of centering attention on relevant facts.<sup>1</sup>

Many discussions of how to conduct a group conference have been written. The following outline was published in "Principles of Personnel Administration," a text prepared by the U.S. Navy Supply Corps School, Bayonne, New Jersey, and is as convenient a listing as has been seen.

### GROUP CONFERENCES AND HOW TO CONDUCT THEM<sup>2</sup>

- I. First step in planning a conference is to be certain you have a justified purpose in arranging it.
  - A. Definite problem to be discussed.
  - B. Knowing that conferees can contribute to its solution.
  - C. Knowing that the solution of problem is worth the time of those who attend.
- II. Have a conference plan which has been reduced to writing.
  - A. Outline form most desirable.
  - B. Should include thoughts for introducing the problem.
  - C. List points to be discussed, possible questions to be asked, and anticipated conclusions to be reached.
- III. Select the people to attend the conference who can contribute to its solution.
  - A. Do not keep opposing factions from the meeting.
  - B. No conference can be successful unless individuals who represent every different viewpoint are in attendance.
- IV. Physical arrangements important.
  - A. Make arrangements for adequate space well ahead of time.
  - B. Provide sufficient chairs.
  - C. Utilize blackboard facilities if available.
  - D. Notify conferees in advance in writing.
  - E. Start the conference on time.
  - F. Provide for stenographic services.

<sup>1</sup>Personnel Administration, Paul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, p. 151.

<sup>2</sup>Principles of Personnel Administration, U.S. Navy Supply Corps School, pp. VI-1 and 2.



- V. The leader of conference must conduct meeting in fair, impartial, openminded manner.
  - A. Avoid attitude that you won't learn anything from others.
  - B. Dispel the attitude that you are right and no one can change your opinion.
  - C. Don't assume that you are going to be done an injustice by others at the conference.
  - D. Make certain that the blame for any action is not focused on any individual.
- VI. Keep the principal subject of the conference on a steady course.
  - A. Avoid letting the discussion get out of hand with non-related topics.
  - B. Don't let a maze of details haze the important problems.
  - C. Make certain that all hands contribute and not just one or two who like to talk.
  - D. Leader should say very little, let the others do the talking.
  - E. Listen very closely to differences of opinion.
    - 1. Sometimes differences can be traced to the use of some words with varying meanings.
    - 2. Sometimes differences are based on personal suspicions and resentments.
    - 3. The differences may be only on minor rather than major items.
- VII. Do not bury controversial issues by getting apparent agreement on nicely phrased generalities.
- VIII. Leader should use well-timed questions in directing conference by stimulating thought and encouraging conservative individuals to participate.
- IX. Avoid embarrassing individuals by putting direct questions to them unless you do not understand something which they said.
- X. At intervals make a summary of the discussion as far as it has progressed.
  - A. This eliminates matters already discussed from being repeated.
- XI. Arrive at conclusions and make certain each one in attendance knows exactly what has been accomplished and what each one must try to accomplish in carrying out the solution of the problem. A written summarization of the conference should be distributed to all who attended the conference for future reference.

Reference: - "Practical Supervision," Palmer J. Kalseur

The following notes have been taken from "Human Nature and Management," by Ordway Tead, and seem desirable for consideration by one

who has the task of leading a conference:

. . . we find available a large body of experiment and experience with effective methods of which use can be made to bring group thinking to much greater usefulness than is usual today.

These requisite conditions may be listed as follows:

1. Have the group the right size--small and compact.
2. Select its members to assure the voicing of every important divergent point of view on the question under discussion.
3. Surround the group with the right physical conditions.
4. Protect it from interruption.
5. Limit the length of its sessions to a fairly short period--usually an hour and a half is long enough unless the members are well disciplined in consecutive thinking.
6. Assure the right preparation for the meeting by using an advance agenda and memorandum of factual data.
7. Select the right chairman.
8. Have him understand the successive steps necessary in facilitating the process of bringing divergent views into harmony.
9. Have him recognize the types of intellectual and emotional complexes which he may confront among the individuals in conference.
10. Use the best possible method for registering decisions.
11. Adopt some system for recording decisions and transmitting them to other affected groups and persons.
12. Recognize the limits upon the nature of the work which a group as such can do.

Up to a point, the group's size may be dictated by the necessity of representing important differences of opinion--either personal or functional in character. But this would not normally require a group of more than 15 persons, which is as large as is usually desirable unless there is a remarkably skilful chairman who can keep as many as twenty people really involved in the discussion. A dozen people or less is ordinarily the most effective number. . . . Since the whole idea of group activity is to bring harmony and unity out of divergence and conflict, the recognition of conflict should not be looked at askance. One unique element in the use of groups for deliberation is this emphasis upon the value of different points of view and even of different purposes.<sup>1</sup>

The Agenda. Preparations for the meeting should include advance notice to all as to what is to be discussed. On some matters, an advance memorandum of all the relevant facts should be distributed as well. Complete access to the facts, preliminary knowledge

<sup>1</sup>Human Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, p. 190.



of the issues--these are vital points if time in conferences is to be economized and soundness of conclusions is to be assured.<sup>1</sup>

Limits to Group Action. It is probably true that the use of groups for creative deliberation has been retarded by the temptation to expect too much of them and to overextend their field of activity. If group action is considered by executives first and foremost as an educational medium and secondarily as a policy--or method-creating agency, the best results on both counts will be secured.<sup>2</sup>

There are many texts available which discuss the group conference. Following is a list of a few that will be worth while for the conference leader to peruse:

- "Human Nature and Management," by Ordway Tead
- "Production Conference," by Jack Wolff
- "How to Supervise People in Industry," by Chaple and Wright
- "How to Train Supervisors," by R. O. Beckman
- "Conference Leadership in Business and Industry," by E. S. Hannaford
- "Handbook for Discussion Leaders," NavPers 16975A, U. S. Navy

Several principles for getting along with people have been enumerated by Dr. S. A. Hamrin, which should assist the conference leader in keeping in mind the purpose of the conference and what it is desired to impart to the petty officers. These principles are:

1. A wise supervisor is friendly rather than aloof.  
This quality comes from knowing and understanding other people.
2. A wise supervisor is helpful rather than critical.  
Avoid the feeling of superiority and inferiority.  
Approve ten times to every single disapproval.
3. The wise supervisor exercises leadership rather than force.
4. The wise supervisor is a colleague rather than a boss.  
Develop the sense of belonging.
5. The wise supervisor promotes cooperation rather than conflict.
6. The wise supervisor upgrades rather than imports.

<sup>1</sup>Human Nature and Management, Ordway Tead, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 195-196.

7. The wise supervisor promotes understanding rather than issuing directives.  
Let others understand why we have rules.
8. The wise supervisor induces confidence rather than fear.
9. The wise supervisor rewards on merit rather than favoritism.
10. The wise supervisor is more concerned with persons than with things.  
A good test of the leadership used is whether the pride and satisfaction of a group is in the equipment, or in the people who use the equipment.<sup>1</sup>

It will prove helpful to the participants as well as to the conference leader if, during a conference, a blackboard is used with the following headings written on it:

Objective	Obstacles	Solutions
-----------	-----------	-----------

Then, as the points are made or solutions reached, they can be listed in the proper column. This provides a summary of what has been done and shows what is unfinished as far as the conference is concerned.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Lecture to class in Education D-136 by Dr. S. A. Harbin, Northwestern University, May 19, 1948.

<sup>2</sup>Production Conference, Jack Wolff, p. 54.



CHECK-LIST FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS<sup>1</sup>

## Preparation

1. Were members notified about meeting time, place, and topic? .....
2. Were the physical arrangements right for good discussion? .....
3. Did I prepare an outline for the discussion? .....
4. Did I provide sufficient background and factual material? .....
5. Were the visual or other aids in place and ready for use? .....
6. Was a friendly, personal atmosphere developed before the discussion started? .....

## Leading the Discussion

7. Did my introduction state the topic? .... Define the areas for discussion? .... Relate them to the interests of the group? .....
8. Was it too long? .....
9. Did it insure that the group had enough information on which to base the discussion? .....
10. Did the group come right into the discussion after the introduction? .....
11. How did I "toss the ball" to the group? .....
12. Did I keep the discussion moving by  
Frequent transitional summaries? .... Checking repetitions? ....  
Calling attention to digressions and irrelevancies? ....  
Pointing up differences of opinion? .... Clarifying the discussion? .....
13. Were the questions and other methods I used to guide the discussion  
Aimed at bringing out reasons, opinions, causes? ....  
Designed to bring out all shades of opinion? ....  
Presented objectively (not slanted or argumentative)? ....  
Worded briefly and clearly? ....  
Thought-provoking (not rhetorical or "yes-no" in form)? ....  
Fairly and tactfully distributed among all members? .....
14. Did I encourage participation by  
Keeping any one member from "hogging the show"? ....  
Drawing out the reticent members? ....  
Expressing appreciation of individual contributions? ....  
Re-directing questions to other members? ....  
Maintaining good humor and fair play? .....
15. Did I bring the discussion to a clear and definite conclusion? ....
16. Did my final summary fairly review all points of view expressed? ..  
State the agreements reached? .... And the points of disagreement? .... Call attention to sources of information? ....  
Announce the next meeting? .....

<sup>1</sup>It Pays to Talk It Over, National Institute of Social Relations, Inc.,  
p. 28.

## Results

17. Were there any indications of satisfaction from members of the group? .....  
Any indications of dissatisfaction from members of the group? .....
18. Were there any unusual problems? .... Did I handle them properly? .....
19. How many members did not participate at all? .....
20. Was the topic suitable for discussion? .....
21. Were any important aspects of the question omitted? .....
22. Was there a clearer understanding of the subject after the discussion? .....
23. What conclusions did the group reach? .....
24. What could I have done better? .....



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beckman, R. O. How to Train Supervisors. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940.
- Carver, Arthur H. Personnel and Labor Problems in the Packing Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928.
- Chapple, Eliot D., and Wright, Edmond F. How to Supervise People in Industry. Chicago: National Foreman's Institute, 1946.
- Complaints and Grievances. New York: Western Electric Co., Hawthorne Works, 1943.
- Cooper, Alfred M. How to Supervise People. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1941.
- Craig, David R., and Charters, W. W. Personal Leadership in Industry. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1941.
- Cushman, Frank. Foremanship and Supervision. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1927.
- Dana, Richard T. The Human Machine in Industry. New York: Codex Book Co., 1927.
- Diemer, Hugo. Foremanship Training. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1927.
- Employee Training. Chicago: The Committee on Education, Chicago Association of Commerce, 1940.
- Evans, J. J., Jr. A Program for Personnel Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945.
- Handbook for Discussion Leaders NAVPERS 16975-A. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1948.
- Hannaford, E. S. Conference Leadership in Business and Industry. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1941.
- Hoslett, Schuyler Dean. Human Factors in Management. Parkville, Mo.: Park College Press, 1946.
- It Pays to Talk It Over. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Social Relations, Inc., 1947.
- Lilley, Tom. "Henry Ford II Speaks Out," The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1947.
- Pigors, Paul, and Myers, Charles A. Personnel Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947.

Thesis  
Y6

Yost

1487

Training the petty  
officers of the United  
States Navy in human re-  
lations

AP 29 60

10982

25 JUN 65

15368

9 MAY 73

~~21432~~

14 AUG 79

25776

1 NOV 82

28466

JAN 23 85

33127

Thesis  
Y6

Yost

1487

Training the petty  
officers of the United  
States Navy in human  
relations.



RESS BINDER

S 2507 EMB

MADE BY


RODUCTS, INC.

NSBURG, N Y.



thesY6

Training the petty officers of the Unite



3 2768 001 90536 7

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY